Any new information about reality, if properly understood (that part is important), can only cause people to become more ethical. Morality is contingent upon the nature of the universe; the better we understand the universe, the better we understand morality.
I think this paragraph is a bit muddled, in more than one way. First, the claim that morality is contingent upon the nature of the universe is ambiguous. The claim may mean, rather trivially, that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends on whether certain ordinary facts obtain (e.g., whether it is wrong for you to refuse money to someone will depend, among other things, on whether you promised this person that you would give her that money). But the claim may also mean, less trivially, that the validity of a moral principle or rule itself is contingent on what the world is like, as some moral constructivists and subjectivists have claimed. It is unclear to me whether you meant the claim in the first sense or in the second sense.
Secondly, and more importantly, that claim, however interpreted, doesn’t support the assertion that “Any new information about reality, if properly understood (that part is important), can only cause people to become more ethical.” There is no necessary causal link between “properly understanding that on which some standard is contingent” and “acting in ways that better conform to this standard”. For example, properly understanding the aspects of reality upon which etiquette is contingent doesn’t invariably (or even usually) cause people to conform to etiquette standards.
I think this paragraph is a bit muddled, in more than one way. First, the claim that morality is contingent upon the nature of the universe is ambiguous. The claim may mean, rather trivially, that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends on whether certain ordinary facts obtain (e.g., whether it is wrong for you to refuse money to someone will depend, among other things, on whether you promised this person that you would give her that money). But the claim may also mean, less trivially, that the validity of a moral principle or rule itself is contingent on what the world is like, as some moral constructivists and subjectivists have claimed. It is unclear to me whether you meant the claim in the first sense or in the second sense.
Secondly, and more importantly, that claim, however interpreted, doesn’t support the assertion that “Any new information about reality, if properly understood (that part is important), can only cause people to become more ethical.” There is no necessary causal link between “properly understanding that on which some standard is contingent” and “acting in ways that better conform to this standard”. For example, properly understanding the aspects of reality upon which etiquette is contingent doesn’t invariably (or even usually) cause people to conform to etiquette standards.