Tanasije, you said “Quinean empiricism,” not empiricism simpliciter. Quine was at least epistemologically physicalist (to whatever degree physicalism can be so restricted), so I thought adding realism made the point cleanly enough.
Anyway, I’m arguing that the reason successful, productive scientists presume “the world can in some measure be described and understood” is that they presuppose a rough-and-ready physicalism with regard to the phenomenon they study. (As I see it, the lack of any scientifically productive appeal to “intrinsic properties” or the like as an explanans is suggestive enough.) The claim, then, that there’s no logical contradiction in doing otherwise is beside the point I was making.
I’ll otherwise submit. Last word’s yours if you want it.
Tanasije, you said “Quinean empiricism,” not empiricism simpliciter. Quine was at least epistemologically physicalist (to whatever degree physicalism can be so restricted), so I thought adding realism made the point cleanly enough.
Anyway, I’m arguing that the reason successful, productive scientists presume “the world can in some measure be described and understood” is that they presuppose a rough-and-ready physicalism with regard to the phenomenon they study. (As I see it, the lack of any scientifically productive appeal to “intrinsic properties” or the like as an explanans is suggestive enough.) The claim, then, that there’s no logical contradiction in doing otherwise is beside the point I was making.
I’ll otherwise submit. Last word’s yours if you want it.