Chapter 11 of the 9/11 commission’s report, available here, shows the commission was very wary of hindsight bias. The failure to prevent the attacks is said to represent a “failure of imagination,” meaning the intelligence community used the wrong model in evaluating terrorist threats.
If you note the study in the article, 56% of those told about the flood but warned to avoid hindsight bias stated the city was negligent, compared to 57% of those told about the flood but not warned to avoid the hindsight bias stated the city was negligent.
76% of the control group, without the benefit of hindsight, concluded the chances of failure were so remote the city could not be held negligent.
Just being aware that you have a potential hindsight bias is clearly meaningless if you have no method for removing the bias.
That said, the “failure of the imagination” sounds reasonable, but it’s about as useful as my horoscope. I.e. it’s not.
Chapter 11 of the 9/11 commission’s report, available here, shows the commission was very wary of hindsight bias. The failure to prevent the attacks is said to represent a “failure of imagination,” meaning the intelligence community used the wrong model in evaluating terrorist threats.
If you note the study in the article, 56% of those told about the flood but warned to avoid hindsight bias stated the city was negligent, compared to 57% of those told about the flood but not warned to avoid the hindsight bias stated the city was negligent.
76% of the control group, without the benefit of hindsight, concluded the chances of failure were so remote the city could not be held negligent.
Just being aware that you have a potential hindsight bias is clearly meaningless if you have no method for removing the bias.
That said, the “failure of the imagination” sounds reasonable, but it’s about as useful as my horoscope. I.e. it’s not.