I agree totally. As someone who has read Chalmers entire book, it’s frustrating to read so many people misinterpreting his views. Chalmers is in no way committed to a strict epiphenomal dualism; with the Zombie argument Chalmers is merely demonstrating the intellectual bankruptcy of traditional reductionist dualism. He hesitantly endorses epiphenomenalism only because he is granting the materalist as many possible premises as he can to make his point. The materialist would seemingly want to hold to these facts:
1)The physical world is causally closed. All physical activity can be explained fully by the laws of physics.
2)The fundamental constituents are in no way conscious and exist as solely extrinsic entities in space and time.
3) The mind is fully reducible to physical activity.
Chalmers grants premise 1 and 2 but then asks, if this is true, why not Zombies? Why couldn’t the universe, made as it is of unconscious entities, simply allow for arrangements of matter exactly like us but without any internal subjective reality? This basic argument seems to me irrefutable; an argument in the face of which materialism must wither and die. Chalmers is fully aware that the most problematic aspect of this argument is the Zombie’s ability to “think” about consciousness. And it is here that Yudkowsky finds Chalmers theories descend into absurdity. But why, if the materialists premises are correct? Indeed it seems, according to a classical view of physics, that if a super-mathematician had perfect knowledge of all arrangements and properties of matter from a very early time in the universe he could predict perfectly the future existence of a book called “‘The Conscious Mind’ written by David Chalmers” and he could make this prediction without any reference to any of Chalmers’ mental states. If this is possible, (and a materialist would seemingly HAVE to agree) then it seems wholly possible that a Zombie could indeed write books on consciousness without consciousness being at all present. Throughout his rebuttal to Chalmers, Yudkowsky tacitly endorses a interactionist view of consciousness where the behavior of a philosopher musing on the vagaries of mind cannot be understood without reference to subjective experience as part of the causal chain. But of course, this gives up the ghost! Chalmers, in fact, does not rule out interactionist dualism, a view which, if true, would make Zombies impossible. Unfortunately, this rules out not only materialism but the causal closure of the physcial world! Chalmers doesn’t want to go out on such a limb. The “defense” of epiphenomenalism Chalmers mounts in his Zombie argument is an attempt to grant as much to the materialist as logically possible. As counter-intuitive epiphenomenalist dualism is it’s still preferable to materialism, a view which is simply impossible. But, again, there are still OPTIONS available to us other than such a strange counter-intuitive position as epiphenomenalism; options which Chalmers ENDORSES! A point Yudkowsky fails to acknowledge.
To speculate further (and digress somewhat), it does seem some sort of panpsychist monism is the most satisfying of all possible psychophysical theories; not only does it have the virtue of maintaining the causal closure of the physical world, it, like the most far-reaching theories of theoretical physics, unites different phenomenon into one structure. It still is problematic however that our thoughts about consciousness, while impossible to be “divorced” from conscious experience (zombies are impossible in a monist view of reality), aren’t caused by consciousness in the same way that the existence of zebras “causes” our beliefs about Zebras. It seems the role of consciousness in the causal chain is deeper and more non-linear in any view of consciousness that isn’t full-blown interactionist dualism. Perhaps this is actually a virtue of monism. Maybe we should expect that subjectivity itself, the thing allows us to have “beliefs” at all (the Zombie has no beliefs as a belief is wholly defined as a subjective intentional state), should play a more “grounded” role in our belief formation mechanism, including beliefs about consciousness. Consciousness doesn’t “cause” our beliefs about consciousness, it merely makes them true. Weird, but not impossible.
If I had to bet, an ultimate theory of reality would be an information theory in which the fundamental constituents of the universe are subjective “monads” undergoing computational processes; I favor this view metaphysically because subjectivity has irreducible “intrinisic” qualities, physical entities are wholly defined by external structure and function. It tells us what the universe is made of “in and of itself,” perhaps penetrating the world of unknowable reality that Kant believed we could never see. And if, as Tononi and Koch’s recent scientific work suggests and consciousness IS integrated information (a view I first heard fuzzily articulated in, that’s right, Chalmer’s The Conscious Mind), then such a theory could explain ALL the phenomenon of the universe, from the cosmological to the phenomenological (because it turns out the former is merely a version of the latter). But this is highly speculative.
Anyway, I don’t think Zombies can exist. Neither probably does Chalmers. But it’s the materialist who has the impossible task here; deny the zombie but maintain the physical world as closed and fundamentally unconscious. He can’t do it.
Mitchell -
I agree totally. As someone who has read Chalmers entire book, it’s frustrating to read so many people misinterpreting his views. Chalmers is in no way committed to a strict epiphenomal dualism; with the Zombie argument Chalmers is merely demonstrating the intellectual bankruptcy of traditional reductionist dualism. He hesitantly endorses epiphenomenalism only because he is granting the materalist as many possible premises as he can to make his point. The materialist would seemingly want to hold to these facts:
1)The physical world is causally closed. All physical activity can be explained fully by the laws of physics.
2)The fundamental constituents are in no way conscious and exist as solely extrinsic entities in space and time.
3) The mind is fully reducible to physical activity.
Chalmers grants premise 1 and 2 but then asks, if this is true, why not Zombies? Why couldn’t the universe, made as it is of unconscious entities, simply allow for arrangements of matter exactly like us but without any internal subjective reality? This basic argument seems to me irrefutable; an argument in the face of which materialism must wither and die. Chalmers is fully aware that the most problematic aspect of this argument is the Zombie’s ability to “think” about consciousness. And it is here that Yudkowsky finds Chalmers theories descend into absurdity. But why, if the materialists premises are correct? Indeed it seems, according to a classical view of physics, that if a super-mathematician had perfect knowledge of all arrangements and properties of matter from a very early time in the universe he could predict perfectly the future existence of a book called “‘The Conscious Mind’ written by David Chalmers” and he could make this prediction without any reference to any of Chalmers’ mental states. If this is possible, (and a materialist would seemingly HAVE to agree) then it seems wholly possible that a Zombie could indeed write books on consciousness without consciousness being at all present. Throughout his rebuttal to Chalmers, Yudkowsky tacitly endorses a interactionist view of consciousness where the behavior of a philosopher musing on the vagaries of mind cannot be understood without reference to subjective experience as part of the causal chain. But of course, this gives up the ghost! Chalmers, in fact, does not rule out interactionist dualism, a view which, if true, would make Zombies impossible. Unfortunately, this rules out not only materialism but the causal closure of the physcial world! Chalmers doesn’t want to go out on such a limb. The “defense” of epiphenomenalism Chalmers mounts in his Zombie argument is an attempt to grant as much to the materialist as logically possible. As counter-intuitive epiphenomenalist dualism is it’s still preferable to materialism, a view which is simply impossible. But, again, there are still OPTIONS available to us other than such a strange counter-intuitive position as epiphenomenalism; options which Chalmers ENDORSES! A point Yudkowsky fails to acknowledge.
To speculate further (and digress somewhat), it does seem some sort of panpsychist monism is the most satisfying of all possible psychophysical theories; not only does it have the virtue of maintaining the causal closure of the physical world, it, like the most far-reaching theories of theoretical physics, unites different phenomenon into one structure. It still is problematic however that our thoughts about consciousness, while impossible to be “divorced” from conscious experience (zombies are impossible in a monist view of reality), aren’t caused by consciousness in the same way that the existence of zebras “causes” our beliefs about Zebras. It seems the role of consciousness in the causal chain is deeper and more non-linear in any view of consciousness that isn’t full-blown interactionist dualism. Perhaps this is actually a virtue of monism. Maybe we should expect that subjectivity itself, the thing allows us to have “beliefs” at all (the Zombie has no beliefs as a belief is wholly defined as a subjective intentional state), should play a more “grounded” role in our belief formation mechanism, including beliefs about consciousness. Consciousness doesn’t “cause” our beliefs about consciousness, it merely makes them true. Weird, but not impossible.
If I had to bet, an ultimate theory of reality would be an information theory in which the fundamental constituents of the universe are subjective “monads” undergoing computational processes; I favor this view metaphysically because subjectivity has irreducible “intrinisic” qualities, physical entities are wholly defined by external structure and function. It tells us what the universe is made of “in and of itself,” perhaps penetrating the world of unknowable reality that Kant believed we could never see. And if, as Tononi and Koch’s recent scientific work suggests and consciousness IS integrated information (a view I first heard fuzzily articulated in, that’s right, Chalmer’s The Conscious Mind), then such a theory could explain ALL the phenomenon of the universe, from the cosmological to the phenomenological (because it turns out the former is merely a version of the latter). But this is highly speculative.
Anyway, I don’t think Zombies can exist. Neither probably does Chalmers. But it’s the materialist who has the impossible task here; deny the zombie but maintain the physical world as closed and fundamentally unconscious. He can’t do it.