Mostly, the concept of “metaphilosophy” is so hopelessly broad that you kinda reach it by definition by thinking about any problem hard enough. This isn’t a good thing, when you have a category so large it contains everything (not saying this applies to you, but it applies to many other people I have met who talked about metaphilosophy), it usually means you are confused.
In retrospect, this is the reason why debates over the simulation hypothesis/Mathematical Universe Hypothesis/computationalism go nowhere, because there is a motte and bailey in the people advocating for these hypotheses which can validly claim their category encompasses everything, but they don’t realize this doesn’t constrain their expectations at all, and thus can’t be used in basically any debate, but the bailey is that this is something important where you should change something, but only a narrower version of the simulation hypothesis/Mathematical Universe Hypothesis/computationalism that doesn’t encompass everything, and the people arguing against those hypotheses don’t realize there’s no way for their hypothesis to be falsified if made general enough.
In retrospect, this is the reason why debates over the simulation hypothesis/Mathematical Universe Hypothesis/computationalism go nowhere, because there is a motte and bailey in the people advocating for these hypotheses which can validly claim their category encompasses everything, but they don’t realize this doesn’t constrain their expectations at all, and thus can’t be used in basically any debate, but the bailey is that this is something important where you should change something, but only a narrower version of the simulation hypothesis/Mathematical Universe Hypothesis/computationalism that doesn’t encompass everything, and the people arguing against those hypotheses don’t realize there’s no way for their hypothesis to be falsified if made general enough.