On reflection, there should be a separate name for the space of arguments that change our terminal values. Using “metaethics” to indicate beliefs about the nature of (ontology of) morality, would free up “metamorals” to indicate those arguments that change our terminal values. So I bow to Zubon and standard usage—even though it still sounds wrong to me.
Toby, the case of needing to shoot someone who will fall down on the button, is of course very easy for a consequentialist to handle; wrongness flows backward from the shooting, as rightness flows backward from the button, and the wrongness outweighs the rightness.
Nonetheless a great deal of human ethics can be understood in terms of deontological-type rules for handling such conflicts—at any particular event-node—and these in turn can often be understood in terms of simple rules that try to compensate for human biases. I.e., “The end doesn’t justify the means” makes sense for humans because of a systematic human tendency to overestimate how likely the end is to be achieved, and to underestimate the negative consequences of dangerous means, especially if the means involves taking power for yourself and the end is the good is the tribe. I have always called such categorically phrased injunctions ethics, which would make “ethics” an entirely different subject from “metaethics”. This Deserves A Separate Post.
There may also be moral values that only make sense when we value a 4D crystal, not a 3D slice—or to put it more precisely, moral values that only make sense when we value a thick 4D slice rather than a thin 4D slice; it’s not as if you can have an instantaneous experience of happiness. “People being in control of their own lives” might only make sense in these terms, because of the connection between past and future. This too is an advanced topic.
It seems that despite all attempts at preparation, there are many other topics I should have posted on first.
On reflection, there should be a separate name for the space of arguments that change our terminal values. Using “metaethics” to indicate beliefs about the nature of (ontology of) morality, would free up “metamorals” to indicate those arguments that change our terminal values. So I bow to Zubon and standard usage—even though it still sounds wrong to me.
Toby, the case of needing to shoot someone who will fall down on the button, is of course very easy for a consequentialist to handle; wrongness flows backward from the shooting, as rightness flows backward from the button, and the wrongness outweighs the rightness.
Nonetheless a great deal of human ethics can be understood in terms of deontological-type rules for handling such conflicts—at any particular event-node—and these in turn can often be understood in terms of simple rules that try to compensate for human biases. I.e., “The end doesn’t justify the means” makes sense for humans because of a systematic human tendency to overestimate how likely the end is to be achieved, and to underestimate the negative consequences of dangerous means, especially if the means involves taking power for yourself and the end is the good is the tribe. I have always called such categorically phrased injunctions ethics, which would make “ethics” an entirely different subject from “metaethics”. This Deserves A Separate Post.
There may also be moral values that only make sense when we value a 4D crystal, not a 3D slice—or to put it more precisely, moral values that only make sense when we value a thick 4D slice rather than a thin 4D slice; it’s not as if you can have an instantaneous experience of happiness. “People being in control of their own lives” might only make sense in these terms, because of the connection between past and future. This too is an advanced topic.
It seems that despite all attempts at preparation, there are many other topics I should have posted on first.