Have the issues around logical first movers (brought up in Ingredients of Timeless Decision Theory) been discussed/solved somewhere I’ve not managed to track down with Google? I’ve been thinking it over and have some possibly useful things to add, but that discussion is ancient and it seems likely that it’s been solved more thoroughly somewhere in the last five years. I’ve found the posts about Masquerade which seems related, but only relevant to the special case of full source code disclosure.
We’ve had some attempts to hash it out (for example, comparing round-robin games of chicken to evolutionary equilibria, with niches for a whole spectrum of agents that win against more-cooperative agents but lose against more-defecting agents). Or talking about Schelling points. But I don’t think there’s been anything really definitive—you should share :)
Have the issues around logical first movers (brought up in Ingredients of Timeless Decision Theory) been discussed/solved somewhere I’ve not managed to track down with Google? I’ve been thinking it over and have some possibly useful things to add, but that discussion is ancient and it seems likely that it’s been solved more thoroughly somewhere in the last five years. I’ve found the posts about Masquerade which seems related, but only relevant to the special case of full source code disclosure.
We’ve had some attempts to hash it out (for example, comparing round-robin games of chicken to evolutionary equilibria, with niches for a whole spectrum of agents that win against more-cooperative agents but lose against more-defecting agents). Or talking about Schelling points. But I don’t think there’s been anything really definitive—you should share :)