Designing an Economy Without Money Issuance: A Public Credit Clearing System

This post proposes a thought experiment and a system design. I am explicitly looking for failure modes, impossibility proofs, and overlooked constraints.


1. The Core Question

Most modern economies rely on money issuance and credit expansion.
This produces three persistent properties:

  1. Hidden redistribution via inflation

  2. Risk externalization, where individual failures propagate system-wide

  3. Opacity, where debt chains are difficult to observe or audit

Rather than asking how to optimize these mechanisms, I want to ask a more basic question:

Is it possible to design an economy where responsibility, risk, and resource usage are perfectly aligned—without money issuance at all?


2. A Constraint-First Approach

Instead of starting from incentives, utility, or equilibrium assumptions, I start from hard invariants.

The system is built around a single non-negotiable rule:

The total amount of credit in the system must always sum to zero.

Formally:

∑i=1NCi=0\sum_{i=1}^{N} C_i = 0i=1∑N​Ci​=0

Where:

  • Ci>0C_i > 0Ci​>0 represents a net contribution to society

  • Ci<0C_i < 0Ci​<0 represents a net liability to society

No actor—human or institutional—can create or destroy credit.


3. Replacing Money with Public Credit

Instead of money, the system uses Public Credit Points.

  • Every transaction is a credit transfer, not a payment

  • Credit is not issued, printed, or mined

  • All credits are ultimately cleared against the system itself

There is no concept of “money supply.”
There is only who owes society and who is owed by society.


4. Central Clearing Without Discretion

The system relies on a Central Public Clearing Engine (CPCE) with strict limitations.

The CPCE:

  • Records all credit changes

  • Enforces predefined rules

  • Provides full auditability of all state transitions

The CPCE cannot:

  • Create credit

  • Forgive debt

  • Modify individual balances

  • Change rules in real time

It is a clearing machine, not a monetary authority.


5. Debt Limits as a Function, Not a Policy

Negative credit (debt) is allowed, but bounded.

Each participant has a Debt Red Line, computed by a transparent function of observable parameters, such as:

  • Historical repayment behavior

  • Stable productive capacity

  • Dependency obligations

  • Sector-level systemic risk

This is not discretionary lending.
It is capacity-based liability accounting.

All parameters, weights, and formulas are public.


6. Failure Is Allowed — Externalization Is Not

The system allows:

  • Business failure

  • Personal failure

  • Innovation with downside risk

What it forbids is risk spillover.

If an agent crosses their debt red line:

  • Their future economic actions are constrained

  • Recovery mechanisms are triggered

  • Costs are internalized to the agent, not socialized

This is closer to conservation laws in physics than to financial regulation.


7. Recovery Instead of Bailouts

Debt failure triggers recovery protocols, not punishment.

Possible measures include:

  • Consumption limits

  • Restrictions on high-risk activities

  • Bounded compulsory labor if necessary

Constraints on recovery:

  • Time-limited

  • Proportional

  • Non-competitive with market labor

  • Solely aimed at restoring balance above the red line

There is no debt forgiveness and no systemic bailout.


8. Relation to Bitcoin and Blockchains

This system borrows from blockchains:

  • Immutability

  • Full auditability

  • Traceable state transitions

It rejects:

  • Mining

  • Token issuance

  • Decentralized consensus for core clearing

The ledger is public; the clearing logic is centralized but rule-bound.


9. What This System Optimizes For (and What It Doesn’t)

Optimizes for:

  • Accountability

  • Transparency

  • Risk containment

  • Long-term stability

Sacrifices:

  • Rapid growth

  • High-leverage innovation

  • Speculative acceleration

This system does not promise prosperity.
It promises honest accounting.


10. Open Questions (Where I Expect This to Break)

I am particularly interested in critiques around:

  1. Does enforcing Σ Credit = 0 overly constrain economic dynamics?

  2. Does bounded debt inevitably suppress socially valuable innovation?

  3. Are recovery mechanisms ethically or practically infeasible at scale?

  4. Can central clearing remain non-discretionary in practice?

  5. What failure modes am I missing?


11. Why I’m Posting This Here

I believe LessWrong is one of the few places where:

  • Hard constraints matter

  • Systemic risk is taken seriously

  • “This cannot work” is considered a useful answer

If this system is flawed, I want to understand exactly where and why.


Thanks for reading. I welcome rigorous criticism more than agreement.

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