An already very convinced person has a probability distribution already very peaked at his/her own truth, so no amount of evidence, argumentative or factual, could change that. I think Stuart was aiming at rational people who avoid to have peaked opinions on something for which there’s no evidential support. Counter-argument failure is weak evidence, so it won’t sway the zealot, but should sway, albeit by a small quantity, the reasonable.
Yes, but everyone thinks they’re reasonable. Just because I can imagine sufficiently rational behaviour does not make me sufficiently rational on an arbitrary issue for this to hold.
Well, everyone can think they’re reasonable for an arbitrary definition of reasonable. If we take it to be “being moved by small quantity of evidence”, then it is possible to check if we are being reasonable or not, on a subject. I don’t think we have such a poor access to our brain that we aren’t even able to tell if we are convinced or not...
Er—ignore them? Creationists have well established epistemic failures. Unless you have evidence the same failures are at work here, then what creationists think isn’t particularly relevant.
The fact that the counter-critiques to creationism seem so very effective, and are very weakly re-rebutted, is more relevant.
Yes, I know they’re wronger than a wrong thing (hence my using them as a counterexample—and, of course, that you used them in your post), but you haven’t shown the difference in the shape of the reasoning applied: your proposed razor doesn’t work well on beliefs held on a level below rational consideration (rational consideration being something that many creationists can do quite well, if sufficiently compartmentalised away from their protected beliefs).
My point is to warn people who want to be rational of a failure mode that makes this razor not something to be relied upon precisely when they hold the belief in question strongly.
This is your advice in the congruent case of the unconvinceable creationist?
An already very convinced person has a probability distribution already very peaked at his/her own truth, so no amount of evidence, argumentative or factual, could change that.
I think Stuart was aiming at rational people who avoid to have peaked opinions on something for which there’s no evidential support. Counter-argument failure is weak evidence, so it won’t sway the zealot, but should sway, albeit by a small quantity, the reasonable.
Yes, but everyone thinks they’re reasonable. Just because I can imagine sufficiently rational behaviour does not make me sufficiently rational on an arbitrary issue for this to hold.
Well, everyone can think they’re reasonable for an arbitrary definition of reasonable. If we take it to be “being moved by small quantity of evidence”, then it is possible to check if we are being reasonable or not, on a subject.
I don’t think we have such a poor access to our brain that we aren’t even able to tell if we are convinced or not...
Er—ignore them? Creationists have well established epistemic failures. Unless you have evidence the same failures are at work here, then what creationists think isn’t particularly relevant.
The fact that the counter-critiques to creationism seem so very effective, and are very weakly re-rebutted, is more relevant.
Yes, I know they’re wronger than a wrong thing (hence my using them as a counterexample—and, of course, that you used them in your post), but you haven’t shown the difference in the shape of the reasoning applied: your proposed razor doesn’t work well on beliefs held on a level below rational consideration (rational consideration being something that many creationists can do quite well, if sufficiently compartmentalised away from their protected beliefs).
I’m not sure I get your point here, sorry!
I’m trying to think of ways that rational people can use to evaluate claims, not ways that can be used rhetorically to convince people in general...
My point is to warn people who want to be rational of a failure mode that makes this razor not something to be relied upon precisely when they hold the belief in question strongly.
Ok, I see the point, and agree it’s an issue.