Others redefine and thereby distinguish pairs of synonyms, like “impairment” and “disabled,” by attaching more specific definitions to them.
The practical consequence of the sort of re-definition you describe is that once people catch on, they just start using “impairment” to mean what “disability” used to mean, and continue to think and say the same things they always thought and said, with only a trivial search-and-replace of “disability” with “impairment” (likewise “disabled” → “impaired”, etc.).
These sorts of re-definitions are attempts to make people think different thoughts by forcing them to say different words. This might work in some cases, but not in such a trivial word-replacement case like this; instead, all you get is a euphemism treadmill, like the increasingly-farcical history of trying to replace words like “retarded”, “homeless” (what’s the latest term? “unhoused”? “unsheltered”? “urban camper”?), etc.
So, for example, to this—
The social model basically says, we are people with impairments and those impairments clearly have an impact on how we live our lives. But the impairments are not the things which disable us.
… the response might be: “Oh, sure, sure, your impairments don’t disable you—perish the thought!—but they do impair you, don’t they. You’re impaired. Too impaired to work at this job, I’m afraid! We need someone unimpaired. Very unfortunate, but what can you do? As you say, you have an impairment and your impairment has an impact on how you live your life.”
And now you’re back to square one.
Meanwhile, when advocates of this distinction try to make genuinely novel claims, like this one—
The solution, according to this model, lies not in fixing the person, but in changing our society. Medical care, for example, should not focus on cures or treatments in order to rid our bodies of functional impairments. Instead, this care should focus on enhancing our daily function in society.
… well, that’s absurd, even horrific, regardless of what word you use. If you say that medical care shouldn’t ever try to give sight to a blind person, then it’s not your word choice that matters, it’s the idea being expressed—and that idea, in this case, is something which it’s perfectly reasonable and right to reject.
Scott quite correctly recognizes that the former sort of thing (euphemism-treadmill-type word replacement) is being deployed in an attempt to sneak in the latter sort of thing (manifestly objectionable ideas).
The practical consequence of the sort of re-definition you describe is that once people catch on, they just start using “impairment” to mean what “disability” used to mean, and continue to think and say the same things they always thought and said, with only a trivial search-and-replace of “disability” with “impairment” (likewise “disabled” → “impaired”, etc.).
These sorts of re-definitions are attempts to make people think different thoughts by forcing them to say different words. This might work in some cases, but not in such a trivial word-replacement case like this; instead, all you get is a euphemism treadmill, like the increasingly-farcical history of trying to replace words like “retarded”, “homeless” (what’s the latest term? “unhoused”? “unsheltered”? “urban camper”?), etc.
So, for example, to this—
… the response might be: “Oh, sure, sure, your impairments don’t disable you—perish the thought!—but they do impair you, don’t they. You’re impaired. Too impaired to work at this job, I’m afraid! We need someone unimpaired. Very unfortunate, but what can you do? As you say, you have an impairment and your impairment has an impact on how you live your life.”
And now you’re back to square one.
Meanwhile, when advocates of this distinction try to make genuinely novel claims, like this one—
… well, that’s absurd, even horrific, regardless of what word you use. If you say that medical care shouldn’t ever try to give sight to a blind person, then it’s not your word choice that matters, it’s the idea being expressed—and that idea, in this case, is something which it’s perfectly reasonable and right to reject.
Scott quite correctly recognizes that the former sort of thing (euphemism-treadmill-type word replacement) is being deployed in an attempt to sneak in the latter sort of thing (manifestly objectionable ideas).