Another take based on the replies. For the most part of the post you seem to be arguing that the difference between your future selves and other people is not magical. We alreadyknow that. This particular difference is nonmagical, but so are all the others, those that matter. If, say, there were no difference in principle, we’d have to discount the crazy idea of distinguishing that which can not be distinguished, but that is not the case here.
Why care more about yourself than other people? More about people than properly sorted piles of pebbles? All these things are made out of atoms, after all, the only difference is in the way those atoms are arranged. But being unable to give a precise response doesn’t argue one way or the other, doesn’t invalidate whatever hold on the answer you’ve got with the best presently available tools. Much value in a human ethical theory is in being able to add up to normality where naturalism upended traditionally magical explanations of ethical notions. So that’s what we have to do for now, before better tools become available.
My which seems to have been lost in most everyone is more nuanced than you might think. I am not arguing rightness or wrongness of fundamental values.
What I am merely trying to point out is that the notion that there is a me, a self that lives through time is incoherent. That really all that exists are people and that preferring one group of people over another requires justification which will be based on whatever morality you ultimately have. That being who is prepared to step forward and say well giving preference to a particular group of people who are similar to the person I am at the present that is is one my fundamental values so I am sticking to it. I think it’s quite ridiculous and people should reexamine what they value. Does anyone actually value similarity in this way? I don’t think so.
Another take based on the replies. For the most part of the post you seem to be arguing that the difference between your future selves and other people is not magical. We already know that. This particular difference is nonmagical, but so are all the others, those that matter. If, say, there were no difference in principle, we’d have to discount the crazy idea of distinguishing that which can not be distinguished, but that is not the case here.
Why care more about yourself than other people? More about people than properly sorted piles of pebbles? All these things are made out of atoms, after all, the only difference is in the way those atoms are arranged. But being unable to give a precise response doesn’t argue one way or the other, doesn’t invalidate whatever hold on the answer you’ve got with the best presently available tools. Much value in a human ethical theory is in being able to add up to normality where naturalism upended traditionally magical explanations of ethical notions. So that’s what we have to do for now, before better tools become available.
My which seems to have been lost in most everyone is more nuanced than you might think. I am not arguing rightness or wrongness of fundamental values. What I am merely trying to point out is that the notion that there is a me, a self that lives through time is incoherent. That really all that exists are people and that preferring one group of people over another requires justification which will be based on whatever morality you ultimately have. That being who is prepared to step forward and say well giving preference to a particular group of people who are similar to the person I am at the present that is is one my fundamental values so I am sticking to it. I think it’s quite ridiculous and people should reexamine what they value. Does anyone actually value similarity in this way? I don’t think so.