Your error minimizer hypothesis doesn’t say anything about why we sometimes genuinely believe that we have a certain goal and then act in a way that’s aimed at a completely different, sometimes contradictory, goal.
The U vs. C hypothesis explains that by proposing a different model: two different satisfcation maximizers (or I guess error minimizers, it comes down to the same result) with different amounts of influence over different, but somewhat overlapping, categories of action. The goals of C will not necessarily be fulfilled by U, and vice-versa, explaining why our bodies sometimes do things that contradict with what C, the part of ourselves with primary responsibility for self-reflection on goals and writing comments on Internet blogs, wants.
I don’t know if the OP necessarily has the best explanation for this phenomenon, but the error minimizing executive function doesn’t explain it at all, I think.
Your error minimizer hypothesis doesn’t say anything about why we sometimes genuinely believe that we have a certain goal and then act in a way that’s aimed at a completely different, sometimes contradictory, goal.
The U vs. C hypothesis explains that by proposing a different model: two different satisfcation maximizers (or I guess error minimizers, it comes down to the same result) with different amounts of influence over different, but somewhat overlapping, categories of action. The goals of C will not necessarily be fulfilled by U, and vice-versa, explaining why our bodies sometimes do things that contradict with what C, the part of ourselves with primary responsibility for self-reflection on goals and writing comments on Internet blogs, wants.
I don’t know if the OP necessarily has the best explanation for this phenomenon, but the error minimizing executive function doesn’t explain it at all, I think.
Fair point—this doesn’t address the heart of the issue. I’ll mull it over and see if the concept can’t be salvaged.