I have an idea about how to make rationality great again (bad joke, but I’m serious). The term “theoretical rationality” may be coined by me—idk, but the new meanings to “theoretical and applied rationality” are mine and include 1)optimisation 2)fast completion of goals and ideals 3)updating the list of desirable goals and ideals 4) repeat. Any comments?
The distinctions are in the application. In my proposed system, the theoretic (epistemic) rationality should mostly be a byproduct of the applied (instrumental) rationality. My view puts a huge emphasis on the knowledge being derived mostly and predominantly derived through (many fast) interactions with the environment, avoiding the pitfalls of fixing scientific “laws” (which themselves are products of many observations). This is not the Bayesian view with priors on what one could expect from looking into some unexpected phenomenon. If it works, it works. If the theory says it can’t work, it would still work.
The conference looks cool, but does not follow the main framework of “theoretical and applied rationality”, as defined by me. More specifically, I can use the term “whatever works (most) effectively” not to cause confusion with the otherwise defined “theoretical and applied rationality”.What I do with my approach is to completely avoid theorization, unless the interactions with the environment uncover a pattern that needs recording. The main focus of the approach is on the applied end. If one needs to, say, improve wealth for the poorest I can’t think of a more efficient way to do so than fast experimentation and coming up with new and better way to do so. The cool bit is that it can be sustainable and empowering, blah, blah, blah (not the focus of this conversation). The idea is that one interacts with the environment to acquire new knowledge. Otherwise one can become detached from the environment as is most of modern maths theory (I study maths in Oxford btw). Collecting theory is very very backwards to the second pillar of rationality—achieving one’s goals and ideals.
I have an idea about how to make rationality great again (bad joke, but I’m serious). The term “theoretical rationality” may be coined by me—idk, but the new meanings to “theoretical and applied rationality” are mine and include 1)optimisation 2)fast completion of goals and ideals 3)updating the list of desirable goals and ideals 4) repeat. Any comments?
how does this compare to the instrumental and epistemic rationality separation?
The distinctions are in the application. In my proposed system, the theoretic (epistemic) rationality should mostly be a byproduct of the applied (instrumental) rationality. My view puts a huge emphasis on the knowledge being derived mostly and predominantly derived through (many fast) interactions with the environment, avoiding the pitfalls of fixing scientific “laws” (which themselves are products of many observations). This is not the Bayesian view with priors on what one could expect from looking into some unexpected phenomenon. If it works, it works. If the theory says it can’t work, it would still work.
Ehrm...
The conference looks cool, but does not follow the main framework of “theoretical and applied rationality”, as defined by me. More specifically, I can use the term “whatever works (most) effectively” not to cause confusion with the otherwise defined “theoretical and applied rationality”.What I do with my approach is to completely avoid theorization, unless the interactions with the environment uncover a pattern that needs recording. The main focus of the approach is on the applied end. If one needs to, say, improve wealth for the poorest I can’t think of a more efficient way to do so than fast experimentation and coming up with new and better way to do so. The cool bit is that it can be sustainable and empowering, blah, blah, blah (not the focus of this conversation). The idea is that one interacts with the environment to acquire new knowledge. Otherwise one can become detached from the environment as is most of modern maths theory (I study maths in Oxford btw). Collecting theory is very very backwards to the second pillar of rationality—achieving one’s goals and ideals.