According to how I understand the proposed view (which might well be wrong!), there seems to be a difficulty that your natural zero affects how to do tradeoffs with the welfare of pre-existing beings. How would the view deal with the following cases:
Case_1:
Agent A has the means to bring being B into existence, but if no further preparations are taken, B will be absolutely miserable. If agent A takes away resources from pre-existing being C in order to later give them to B, thereby causing a great deal of suffering to C, B’s life-prospects can be improved to a total welfare of slightly above zero. If the natural zero is sufficiently negative, would such a transaction be permissible?
Case_2:
If it’s not permissible, it seems that we must penalize cases where the natural zero starts out negative. However, how about a case where the natural zero is just slightly negative, but agent A only needs to invest a tiny effort in order to guarantee being B a hugely positive life. Would that always be impermissible?
This is the tricky issue of dealing with natural zeros that are below the “zero” of happy/meaningful lives (whatever that is).
As I said, this isn’t my favourite setup, but I would advocate requiring the natural zero be positive, and not bringing anyone into existence otherwise. That means that I’d have to reject Case_2 - unless there is anyone who would be sufficiently happy about the existence of B with a hugely positive life, that the tiny effort is less than that happiness.
Total utilitarians, your own happiness can make people come into existence even in these non-total ut situations!
According to how I understand the proposed view (which might well be wrong!), there seems to be a difficulty that your natural zero affects how to do tradeoffs with the welfare of pre-existing beings. How would the view deal with the following cases:
Case_1: Agent A has the means to bring being B into existence, but if no further preparations are taken, B will be absolutely miserable. If agent A takes away resources from pre-existing being C in order to later give them to B, thereby causing a great deal of suffering to C, B’s life-prospects can be improved to a total welfare of slightly above zero. If the natural zero is sufficiently negative, would such a transaction be permissible?
Case_2: If it’s not permissible, it seems that we must penalize cases where the natural zero starts out negative. However, how about a case where the natural zero is just slightly negative, but agent A only needs to invest a tiny effort in order to guarantee being B a hugely positive life. Would that always be impermissible?
This is the tricky issue of dealing with natural zeros that are below the “zero” of happy/meaningful lives (whatever that is).
As I said, this isn’t my favourite setup, but I would advocate requiring the natural zero be positive, and not bringing anyone into existence otherwise. That means that I’d have to reject Case_2 - unless there is anyone who would be sufficiently happy about the existence of B with a hugely positive life, that the tiny effort is less than that happiness.
Total utilitarians, your own happiness can make people come into existence even in these non-total ut situations!