I’ve never really understood this argument. In general, for two separate hypotheses A and B, by most notions of more complicated “A and B” will be more complicated but often easier to falsify. This will apply trivially when both hypotheses talk about completely different domains. So for example, “The sun is powered by fusion” and “Obama will be reelected” are both falsifiable but “”The sun is powered by fusion and Obama will be reelected” is at least as easy to falsify. This is connected to the conjunction fallacy. There may be a notion of natural hypotheses that don’t do things that just connect hypotheses about very separate areas, but I don’t know any way of making that precise.
I always liked what, I think, was Karl Popper’s defense of Okham’s Razor—simpler theories are easier to falsify.
I’ve never really understood this argument. In general, for two separate hypotheses A and B, by most notions of more complicated “A and B” will be more complicated but often easier to falsify. This will apply trivially when both hypotheses talk about completely different domains. So for example, “The sun is powered by fusion” and “Obama will be reelected” are both falsifiable but “”The sun is powered by fusion and Obama will be reelected” is at least as easy to falsify. This is connected to the conjunction fallacy. There may be a notion of natural hypotheses that don’t do things that just connect hypotheses about very separate areas, but I don’t know any way of making that precise.