Admitting and apologizing for being ‘only average’ often functions as a submission move in dominance hierarchies, i.e. pecking orders.
This move derails attempts to enact more naïve, descriptive-language accountability. When someone has a specific grievance, it corresponds to a claim about the relation between facts and commitments that can be evaluated as true or false. Responding with self-deprecation transforms their concrete complaint into a mere opportunity to either accept or reject the display of submission. This disrupts the sort of language in which object-level accounting can happen, since the original specific issues are neither addressed nor refuted. Rather, they are displaced by the lower-dimensional social dynamics of dominance and submission.
So viewed systemically, such moves are part of a distributed strategy by which pecking orders disrupt and displace descriptive language communities by coordinating to invalidate them. And viewed locally, they erase the specific grievance from common knowledge, preserving the motivating shame.
I don’t think you understand, in the example I gave they don’t think they are ‘average’ they think their performance was not to the standard they hold themselves, and they believe that this was precipitated by their drinking which they regret. He is talking PAST the person after the show, not to them, almost like a soliloquy.
Do you think that every time you’ve ever felt shame it has always been primarily because of what others may think of you? You have never ever felt a solipsistic shame, a shame even though no one will know, no one will care, it has no negative influence on anyone other than yourself, and the only person you have to answer to is you? Never?
Except frequently I think people who are ashamed don’t expect this. Imagine that instead of concealing they openly admit and apologize for being only average: then what? Aren’t they still ashamed?
Different example—I said “instead”—so if the musician openly admits and apologize for only being average they are ashamed because they are afraid of the reaction of the fan who clearly loved their performance (not their failure to abstain from what they believe is the cause of their average performance?), but if they don’t mention it to anyone (therefore are committing neither a dominance nor submission gesture) they are also ashamed? Or are they not ashamed in both circumstances? I’m just saying I’m really confused.
Are you telling me there is no conceivable circumstance where any human being feels shame for something which is totally alone, none at all? Because at the risk of assuming I have privileged knowledge of myself—I assure you I’ve felt shame for things which no one would care about.
If you look back, you’ll see I was specifically responding to the hypothetical scenario about public admission in that comment. For your points about private shame, you might want to check my other comment replying to you where I addressed how internal shame and self-image maintenance connect to social dynamics.
I notice you’re attributing positions to me that I haven’t taken and expressing confusion about points I’ve already addressed in detail. It would be helpful if you could engage more carefully with what I’ve carefully written.
so if the musician openly admits and apologize for only being average they are ashamed because they are afraid of the reaction of the fan who clearly loved their performance (not their failure to abstain from what they believe is the cause of their average performance?)
You’re introducing new elements that weren’t in your original scenario. But more importantly: you described the show as “a hit” where “everyone loves them.” Calling this performance “only average” isn’t accurately revealing adverse information—it’s a lie.
but if they don’t mention it to anyone (therefore are committing neither a dominance nor submission gesture) they are also ashamed?
In my other reply to you, I explained how private shame often involves maintaining conflicting mental models—one that enables confident performance and another that tracks specific flaws for improvement. Even when no one would directly know or care about staying up late drinking, the performer may feel shame because they’ve invested in an identity as a “professional musician” or “disciplined performer”—an identity that others care about and grant certain privileges to. The shame comes from violating the requirements of this identity, which serves as a proxy for social approval and professional opportunities. This creates internal pressure toward shame even without a specific idea of someone else who would directly condemn the behavior or trait in question.
Are you telling me there is no conceivable circumstance where any human being feels shame for something which is totally alone, none at all?
What I’m suggesting is that shame inherently involves at least a tacit social component—some imagined perspective by which we are condemned. This is consistent with Smith’s and Hume’s moral sentiments theory, where moral judgments fundamentally involve taking up imagined perspectives of others. This doesn’t mean the shame isn’t genuinely felt or that any specific others would actually condemn us. But in my experience people can frequently unravel particular cases of such shame by honestly examining what specific others would actually think if they knew, which is some experimental validation for this view.
Admitting and apologizing for being ‘only average’ often functions as a submission move in dominance hierarchies, i.e. pecking orders.
This move derails attempts to enact more naïve, descriptive-language accountability. When someone has a specific grievance, it corresponds to a claim about the relation between facts and commitments that can be evaluated as true or false. Responding with self-deprecation transforms their concrete complaint into a mere opportunity to either accept or reject the display of submission. This disrupts the sort of language in which object-level accounting can happen, since the original specific issues are neither addressed nor refuted. Rather, they are displaced by the lower-dimensional social dynamics of dominance and submission.
So viewed systemically, such moves are part of a distributed strategy by which pecking orders disrupt and displace descriptive language communities by coordinating to invalidate them. And viewed locally, they erase the specific grievance from common knowledge, preserving the motivating shame.
I don’t think you understand, in the example I gave they don’t think they are ‘average’ they think their performance was not to the standard they hold themselves, and they believe that this was precipitated by their drinking which they regret. He is talking PAST the person after the show, not to them, almost like a soliloquy.
Do you think that every time you’ve ever felt shame it has always been primarily because of what others may think of you? You have never ever felt a solipsistic shame, a shame even though no one will know, no one will care, it has no negative influence on anyone other than yourself, and the only person you have to answer to is you? Never?
In this example?
Different example—I said “instead”—so if the musician openly admits and apologize for only being average they are ashamed because they are afraid of the reaction of the fan who clearly loved their performance (not their failure to abstain from what they believe is the cause of their average performance?), but if they don’t mention it to anyone (therefore are committing neither a dominance nor submission gesture) they are also ashamed? Or are they not ashamed in both circumstances? I’m just saying I’m really confused.
Are you telling me there is no conceivable circumstance where any human being feels shame for something which is totally alone, none at all? Because at the risk of assuming I have privileged knowledge of myself—I assure you I’ve felt shame for things which no one would care about.
If you look back, you’ll see I was specifically responding to the hypothetical scenario about public admission in that comment. For your points about private shame, you might want to check my other comment replying to you where I addressed how internal shame and self-image maintenance connect to social dynamics.
I notice you’re attributing positions to me that I haven’t taken and expressing confusion about points I’ve already addressed in detail. It would be helpful if you could engage more carefully with what I’ve carefully written.
You’re introducing new elements that weren’t in your original scenario. But more importantly: you described the show as “a hit” where “everyone loves them.” Calling this performance “only average” isn’t accurately revealing adverse information—it’s a lie.
In my other reply to you, I explained how private shame often involves maintaining conflicting mental models—one that enables confident performance and another that tracks specific flaws for improvement. Even when no one would directly know or care about staying up late drinking, the performer may feel shame because they’ve invested in an identity as a “professional musician” or “disciplined performer”—an identity that others care about and grant certain privileges to. The shame comes from violating the requirements of this identity, which serves as a proxy for social approval and professional opportunities. This creates internal pressure toward shame even without a specific idea of someone else who would directly condemn the behavior or trait in question.
What I’m suggesting is that shame inherently involves at least a tacit social component—some imagined perspective by which we are condemned. This is consistent with Smith’s and Hume’s moral sentiments theory, where moral judgments fundamentally involve taking up imagined perspectives of others. This doesn’t mean the shame isn’t genuinely felt or that any specific others would actually condemn us. But in my experience people can frequently unravel particular cases of such shame by honestly examining what specific others would actually think if they knew, which is some experimental validation for this view.