You’re begging the question by assuming that selfish motives are the only real, valid ultimate justifications for actions (including choices to self-modify not to be selfish), when in humans that is plainly false to begin with (see the Complexity of Value sequence). If you place a higher value on selfishness then most people, then maybe all of your moral deliberation will begin and end with asking “But how does that help me?”, but for most people it won’t. Perhaps a lot of people will confuse themselves into thinking that everything must go back to a selfish motive if they recurse too far into metaethics they don’t understand, but ultimately… well, I’ll let the Metaethics Sequence say it better than I can right now.
(That is: you seem to be unaware of the huge amount of existing discussion of this subject on Less Wrong, and you should read some of it before continuing with this series of posts. Vladimir Nesov’s comment should point you in the right direction.)
You’re begging the question by assuming that selfish motives are the only real, valid ultimate justifications for actions (including choices to self-modify not to be selfish), when in humans that is plainly false to begin with (see the Complexity of Value sequence). If you place a higher value on selfishness then most people, then maybe all of your moral deliberation will begin and end with asking “But how does that help me?”, but for most people it won’t. Perhaps a lot of people will confuse themselves into thinking that everything must go back to a selfish motive if they recurse too far into metaethics they don’t understand, but ultimately… well, I’ll let the Metaethics Sequence say it better than I can right now.
(That is: you seem to be unaware of the huge amount of existing discussion of this subject on Less Wrong, and you should read some of it before continuing with this series of posts. Vladimir Nesov’s comment should point you in the right direction.)