This intuitively feels epistemologically arrogant, but it succeeds in solving the probability language discrepancy.
In general I support the thought that you avoid a lot of pitfalls if you’re really precise and really upfront about what kinds of evidence you’ll accept and not. I suspect that that kind of planning is not discussed enough in rationalist-circles, so I appreciate this post! You’re upfront about the fact that you’ll accept a non-explicit signal. I see nothing wrong with that, given that you’re many inferential steps from a shared understanding of probability.
In general I support the thought that you avoid a lot of pitfalls if you’re really precise and really upfront about what kinds of evidence you’ll accept and not. I suspect that that kind of planning is not discussed enough in rationalist-circles, so I appreciate this post! You’re upfront about the fact that you’ll accept a non-explicit signal. I see nothing wrong with that, given that you’re many inferential steps from a shared understanding of probability.