This is a bit tangential, but perhaps a bounded rationalist should represent his beliefs by a family of probability functions, rather than by an approximate probability function. When he needs to make a decision, he can compute upper and lower bounds on the expected utilities of each choice, and then either make the decision based on the beliefs he has, or decide to seek out or recall further information if the upper and lower expected utilities point to different choices, and the bounds are too far apart compared to the cost of getting more information.
I found one decision theory that uses families of probability functions like this (page 35 of http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.37.1906), although the motivation is different. I wonder if such decision systems have been considered for the purpose of handling bounded rationality.
This is a bit tangential, but perhaps a bounded rationalist should represent his beliefs by a family of probability functions, rather than by an approximate probability function. When he needs to make a decision, he can compute upper and lower bounds on the expected utilities of each choice, and then either make the decision based on the beliefs he has, or decide to seek out or recall further information if the upper and lower expected utilities point to different choices, and the bounds are too far apart compared to the cost of getting more information.
I found one decision theory that uses families of probability functions like this (page 35 of http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.37.1906), although the motivation is different. I wonder if such decision systems have been considered for the purpose of handling bounded rationality.