I claim that if you find someone who’s struggling to get out of bed, making groaning noises, and ask them the following question:
Hey, I have a question about your values. The thing you’re doing right now, staying in bed past your alarm, in order to be more comfortable at the expense of probably missing your train and having to walk to work in the cold rain … is this thing you’re doing in accordance with your values?
I bet the person says “no”. Yet, they’re still in fact doing that thing, which implies (tautologically) that they have some desire to do it—I mean, they’re not doing it “by accident”! So it’s conflicting desires, not conflicting values.
I don’t think your wooden log example is relevant. Insofar as different values are conflicting, that conflict has already long ago been resolved, and the resolution is: the action which best accords with the person’s values, in this instance, is to get up. And yet, they’re still horizontal.
Another example: if someone says “I want to act in accordance with my values” or “I don’t always act in accordance with my values”, we recognize these as two substantive claims. The first is not a tautology, and the second is not a self-contradiction.
I agree, but I think it’s important to mention issues like social desirability bias and strategic self-deception here, coupled with the fact that most people just aren’t particularly good at introspection.
it’s conflicting desires, not conflicting values
It’s both, our minds employ desires in service of pursuing our (often conflicting) values.
Insofar as different values are conflicting, that conflict has already long ago been resolved, and the resolution is: the action which best accords with the person’s values, in this instance, is to get up.
I’d rather put it as a routine conflict eventually getting resolved in a predictable way.
Another example: if someone says “I want to act in accordance with my values” or “I don’t always act in accordance with my values”, we recognize these as two substantive claims. The first is not a tautology, and the second is not a self-contradiction.
Indeed, but I claim that those statements actually mean “I want my value conflicts to resolve in the way I endorse” and “I don’t always endorse the way my value conflicts resolve”.
I claim that if you find someone who’s struggling to get out of bed, making groaning noises, and ask them the following question:
I bet the person says “no”. Yet, they’re still in fact doing that thing, which implies (tautologically) that they have some desire to do it—I mean, they’re not doing it “by accident”! So it’s conflicting desires, not conflicting values.
I don’t think your wooden log example is relevant. Insofar as different values are conflicting, that conflict has already long ago been resolved, and the resolution is: the action which best accords with the person’s values, in this instance, is to get up. And yet, they’re still horizontal.
Another example: if someone says “I want to act in accordance with my values” or “I don’t always act in accordance with my values”, we recognize these as two substantive claims. The first is not a tautology, and the second is not a self-contradiction.
I agree, but I think it’s important to mention issues like social desirability bias and strategic self-deception here, coupled with the fact that most people just aren’t particularly good at introspection.
It’s both, our minds employ desires in service of pursuing our (often conflicting) values.
I’d rather put it as a routine conflict eventually getting resolved in a predictable way.
Indeed, but I claim that those statements actually mean “I want my value conflicts to resolve in the way I endorse” and “I don’t always endorse the way my value conflicts resolve”.