Seems hard for it to mean something if you didn’t intend it to mean something though? I’ve always found it odd when someone makes something then says they don’t understand it, this isn’t unique to this instance
I think my position is different than this—I believe both that (1) an author can (and does) intend writing to mean something, and (2) an author’s intent in writing a text does not fix the meaning of that text (but an explanation does, which is thus limiting). For an overview of this argument, see here; for primary sources, see here or here. I think this is almost necessarily the framework one has to take reading James Joyce or David Foster Wallace, for example.
I intended not to explain this story for the reasoning described in the linked texts, but whatever; I’m a Bad Post-Structuralist so I’ll update and provide an interpretation I see as important:
We need to understand that all systems of understanding the world—including pure math—are exactly that: epistemological frameworks. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and the Münchhausen trilemma both imply that we can’t really “prove” epistemological frameworks—that is, ground them in a provably objective territory—meaning they are proxies. I think that reminding ourselves of this is increasingly important as frameworks we constructed as imperfect proxies for understanding our experiences become increasingly and dogmatically accepted as Real outside of their systems (lest we reify the simulacra—see primary source argument here, which directly addresses the map-territory distinction). Remembering this is also particularly important if such frameworks are being used to justify actions that counter our common-sense intuitions about “rightness” and “wrongness,” I think (acknowledging that this argument is based on my own chosen and fundamentally unjustifiable values).
Of course, this entails accepting infinite regress/uncertainty about everything—including this argument—which is hard and inconvenient.
Some even higher-order implications I see in this are that (a) desire (for control, to be controlled; for understanding, to be understood) is the root of all suffering and (b) compassion for all beings without exception (i.e., including ourselves) is important (under my value framework), but I think explaining how I see that as implied might require its own post (and I’m doubtful about how that would be received here, as it itself hinges on a post-structuralist framework which requires dialectical reasoning to reconcile with rationalism).
I have other interpretations/implications I find salient but I’ll stop there. I hope this provides some clarity/insight and thank you for your interest :-)
I think my position is different than this—I believe both that (1) an author can (and does) intend writing to mean something, and (2) an author’s intent in writing a text does not fix the meaning of that text (but an explanation does, which is thus limiting). For an overview of this argument, see here; for primary sources, see here or here. I think this is almost necessarily the framework one has to take reading James Joyce or David Foster Wallace, for example.
I intended not to explain this story for the reasoning described in the linked texts, but whatever; I’m a Bad Post-Structuralist so I’ll update and provide an interpretation I see as important:
We need to understand that all systems of understanding the world—including pure math—are exactly that: epistemological frameworks. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and the Münchhausen trilemma both imply that we can’t really “prove” epistemological frameworks—that is, ground them in a provably objective territory—meaning they are proxies. I think that reminding ourselves of this is increasingly important as frameworks we constructed as imperfect proxies for understanding our experiences become increasingly and dogmatically accepted as Real outside of their systems (lest we reify the simulacra—see primary source argument here, which directly addresses the map-territory distinction). Remembering this is also particularly important if such frameworks are being used to justify actions that counter our common-sense intuitions about “rightness” and “wrongness,” I think (acknowledging that this argument is based on my own chosen and fundamentally unjustifiable values).
Of course, this entails accepting infinite regress/uncertainty about everything—including this argument—which is hard and inconvenient.
Some even higher-order implications I see in this are that (a) desire (for control, to be controlled; for understanding, to be understood) is the root of all suffering and (b) compassion for all beings without exception (i.e., including ourselves) is important (under my value framework), but I think explaining how I see that as implied might require its own post (and I’m doubtful about how that would be received here, as it itself hinges on a post-structuralist framework which requires dialectical reasoning to reconcile with rationalism).
I have other interpretations/implications I find salient but I’ll stop there. I hope this provides some clarity/insight and thank you for your interest :-)