If we use time discounting we should care about the future, because it’s possible that time machines can be made, but are difficult. If so, we’d need a lot of people work it out. A time machine would be valuable normally, but under time discounting, it gets insane. I don’t know what half-life you’re using, but let’s use 1000 years, just for simplicity. Lets say that we bring a single person back to the beginning of the universe, for one year. This would effectively create about 8.7*10^4,154,213 QALYs. Any chance of time travel would make this worth while.
I’ve considered this as a reason why attempting to use time discounting for an FAI could fail.
Also, if time-independent quantum physics is to believed, time is not an inherent property of the universe, so you can’t really discount by it.
That’s interesting. I don’t think you should extend your utility function into the past that way. You have to go back to the application, and ask why you’re doing discounting in the first place. It would be more reasonable to discount for distance from the present, whether forwards or backwards in time.
Elsewhere in this thread, you have criticised hyperbolic discounting for being ‘irrational’, by which I presume you mean the fact that is inconsistent under reflection, while exponentials are not.
It would be more reasonable to discount for distance from the present, whether forwards or backwards in time.
Your new function is also inconsistent under reflection.
Maybe this is an argument for not discounting, since that is the only possible way to have a past-future symmetric, reflexively consistent utility function.
Elsewhere in this thread, you have criticised hyperbolic discounting for being ‘irrational’, by which I presume you mean the fact that is inconsistent under reflection, while exponentials are not.
If we use time discounting we should care about the future, because it’s possible that time machines can be made, but are difficult. If so, we’d need a lot of people work it out. A time machine would be valuable normally, but under time discounting, it gets insane. I don’t know what half-life you’re using, but let’s use 1000 years, just for simplicity. Lets say that we bring a single person back to the beginning of the universe, for one year. This would effectively create about 8.7*10^4,154,213 QALYs. Any chance of time travel would make this worth while.
I’ve considered this as a reason why attempting to use time discounting for an FAI could fail.
Also, if time-independent quantum physics is to believed, time is not an inherent property of the universe, so you can’t really discount by it.
This has been previously discussed on Less Wrong.
That’s interesting. I don’t think you should extend your utility function into the past that way. You have to go back to the application, and ask why you’re doing discounting in the first place. It would be more reasonable to discount for distance from the present, whether forwards or backwards in time.
Elsewhere in this thread, you have criticised hyperbolic discounting for being ‘irrational’, by which I presume you mean the fact that is inconsistent under reflection, while exponentials are not.
Your new function is also inconsistent under reflection.
Maybe this is an argument for not discounting, since that is the only possible way to have a past-future symmetric, reflexively consistent utility function.
Just a thought.
Not really—this is the problem.
We are referring to the same fact. Reflective inconsistency is a trivial consequence of dynamic inconsistency.