A 35 year old model had a simple typo in it that got repeated in papers that built on it. Very easy to convince people that this is the case, but very difficult to discover such errors—most such papers don’t have those errors so you need to replicate a lot of correct papers to find the one that’s wrong.
If it’s difficult to show that the typo actually matters, that’s part of the difficulty of discovering it. My point is you should expect the sum of the difficulty in explaining and the difficulty in discovery to be roughly constant.
If it’s difficult to show that the typo actually matters, that’s part of the difficulty of discovering it. My point is you should expect the sum of the difficulty in explaining and the difficulty in discovery to be roughly constant.
I don’t see why it would be roughly constant. I don’t even see why it would tradeoff for your examples: in the maths case, you could say that if you understood everything clearly about the proof, the typo and its consequence, you could convince most mathematicians of it. But for your political examples, finding the correct view seems way harder than to find a typo in a math proof and convincing others is way more difficult than for the maths typo.
Assume you’re at the frontier of being able to do research in that area and have similar abilities to others in that reference class. The total amount of effort most of those people will put in is the same, but it will be split across these two factors differently. The system being unexploitable corresponds to the sum here being constant.
There can be examples where both sides are difficult, which are out of the frontier.
Re politics, there are some issues that are difficult, some issues that are value judgments, and some that are fairly simple in the sense that spending a week seriously researching is enough to be pretty confident of the direction policy should be moved in.
My point is that it’s rare and therefore difficult to discover.
The kinds that are less rare are easier to discover but harder to convince others of, or at least harder to convince people that they matter.
I was drawing off this example, by the way: https://econjwatch.org/articles/recalculating-gravity-a-correction-of-bergstrands-1985-frictionless-case
A 35 year old model had a simple typo in it that got repeated in papers that built on it. Very easy to convince people that this is the case, but very difficult to discover such errors—most such papers don’t have those errors so you need to replicate a lot of correct papers to find the one that’s wrong.
If it’s difficult to show that the typo actually matters, that’s part of the difficulty of discovering it. My point is you should expect the sum of the difficulty in explaining and the difficulty in discovery to be roughly constant.
I don’t see why it would be roughly constant. I don’t even see why it would tradeoff for your examples: in the maths case, you could say that if you understood everything clearly about the proof, the typo and its consequence, you could convince most mathematicians of it. But for your political examples, finding the correct view seems way harder than to find a typo in a math proof and convincing others is way more difficult than for the maths typo.
Assume you’re at the frontier of being able to do research in that area and have similar abilities to others in that reference class. The total amount of effort most of those people will put in is the same, but it will be split across these two factors differently. The system being unexploitable corresponds to the sum here being constant.
There can be examples where both sides are difficult, which are out of the frontier.
Re politics, there are some issues that are difficult, some issues that are value judgments, and some that are fairly simple in the sense that spending a week seriously researching is enough to be pretty confident of the direction policy should be moved in.