You could have the proceeds from new governance tokens go to the governors instead of the treasury. You could make any motion that doesn’t reach consensus split the DAO: If p% were in favor, the company has a p% chance of being split up among those in favor, and a 1-p% chance of being split up among those opposed.
These are really interesting mechanisms you’re proposing. The first one I think amounts to something along the lines of how Moloch DAO works. Essentially you’re paying existing members to join the club. I could definitely make that an option if there’s demand (thank you Claude Code!).
As for the DAO splitting, that sounds fascinating, but I don’t understand it. Care to elaborate?
My purpose for the first is to not let a raider steal his entry fee too.
My purpose for the second is to effectively require consensus for any motions to pass, while leaving a way out of deadlock that is neutral in expectation.
You could have the proceeds from new governance tokens go to the governors instead of the treasury. You could make any motion that doesn’t reach consensus split the DAO: If p% were in favor, the company has a p% chance of being split up among those in favor, and a 1-p% chance of being split up among those opposed.
These are really interesting mechanisms you’re proposing. The first one I think amounts to something along the lines of how Moloch DAO works. Essentially you’re paying existing members to join the club. I could definitely make that an option if there’s demand (thank you Claude Code!).
As for the DAO splitting, that sounds fascinating, but I don’t understand it. Care to elaborate?
My purpose for the first is to not let a raider steal his entry fee too.
My purpose for the second is to effectively require consensus for any motions to pass, while leaving a way out of deadlock that is neutral in expectation.