I model my computer as a complex system; when it has undesired behavior, I give it a known set of conditions and it behaves consistently and often predictably.
I don’t expect it to engage in goal-oriented behavior.
There are people who I model in a similar manner- I know what they do in certain conditions, and I don’t ask what it is they are trying to accomplish. There are cases where I behave in a similar manner, performing sphexish behavior even while consciously aware of it. Noticing that I am doing that evokes cognitive dissonance, so I guess I don’t actually model myself that way, even when it would be accurate to do so.
There are cases where I behave in a similar manner, performing sphexish behavior even while consciously aware of it. Noticing that I am doing that evokes cognitive dissonance, so I guess I don’t actually model myself that way, even when it would be accurate to do so.
Huh. I frequently notice myself behaving in a seemingly robotic fashion, doing stuff “automatically” with no real conscious input (e.g. when doing simple, routine tasks like folding laundry), but it doesn’t give me any feeling of cognitive dissonance.
To try to answer your question: If I find myself behaving “automatically” in a counterproductive manner, that’s an uncomfortable situation to be in, and to me, it emphasizes the fact that I’m not a “pure goal-oriented agent”. I do feel a sort of cognitive dissonance in this cases, I think; I feel like the fact that I’m not behaving productively is “my fault” and it would be easy for me to stop doing what I’m doing, while simultaneously feeling like it would be very difficult to stop doing what I’m doing.
Because I described a situation in which I felt a certain way, and you expressed that you felt a different way in a situation which had certain similarities. I felt that I could identify a significant difference between those situations and wanted to confirm that we probably have similar subjective experiences when confronted with similar enough circumstances.
Had I discovered a difference, it would be worth further discussion. I’m unsure if this similarity is worth further discussion. Feeling like it would be trivial to do something else, believing that I want to do something else, but not doing something else is a common enough failure mode for me to be worrisome.
I haven’t codified the exact distinction that I make between those two concepts; in the case of material science, a ‘problem’ would be a pressure vessel at a low temperature containing high pressure; the failure mode of such a problem would be brittle fracture.
In this case it might also have made sense to call it a class of problems; each instance is different enough that a general solution would be different in nature from a series of specific solutions which combined covered every individual exemplified case.
I model my computer as a complex system; when it has undesired behavior, I give it a known set of conditions and it behaves consistently and often predictably.
I don’t expect it to engage in goal-oriented behavior.
There are people who I model in a similar manner- I know what they do in certain conditions, and I don’t ask what it is they are trying to accomplish. There are cases where I behave in a similar manner, performing sphexish behavior even while consciously aware of it. Noticing that I am doing that evokes cognitive dissonance, so I guess I don’t actually model myself that way, even when it would be accurate to do so.
Huh. I frequently notice myself behaving in a seemingly robotic fashion, doing stuff “automatically” with no real conscious input (e.g. when doing simple, routine tasks like folding laundry), but it doesn’t give me any feeling of cognitive dissonance.
What about when the behavior you are doing has counterproductive results?
What are you asking, exactly?
To try to answer your question: If I find myself behaving “automatically” in a counterproductive manner, that’s an uncomfortable situation to be in, and to me, it emphasizes the fact that I’m not a “pure goal-oriented agent”. I do feel a sort of cognitive dissonance in this cases, I think; I feel like the fact that I’m not behaving productively is “my fault” and it would be easy for me to stop doing what I’m doing, while simultaneously feeling like it would be very difficult to stop doing what I’m doing.
Because I described a situation in which I felt a certain way, and you expressed that you felt a different way in a situation which had certain similarities. I felt that I could identify a significant difference between those situations and wanted to confirm that we probably have similar subjective experiences when confronted with similar enough circumstances.
Had I discovered a difference, it would be worth further discussion. I’m unsure if this similarity is worth further discussion. Feeling like it would be trivial to do something else, believing that I want to do something else, but not doing something else is a common enough failure mode for me to be worrisome.
nod
Tangential question: why did you use “failure mode” there instead of “problem”?
I haven’t codified the exact distinction that I make between those two concepts; in the case of material science, a ‘problem’ would be a pressure vessel at a low temperature containing high pressure; the failure mode of such a problem would be brittle fracture.
In this case it might also have made sense to call it a class of problems; each instance is different enough that a general solution would be different in nature from a series of specific solutions which combined covered every individual exemplified case.