The Laffer curve sloping downward (once past the optimal tax rate) does not require agents entering a shadow economy. It is very much possible that agents merely choose not to work, as the cost of marginal effort is not sufficiently rewarded with enough marginal income.
So in the specific example, there is no guarantee some secret agent must emerge. Higher tax rates merely increase the incentive to avoid taxation, they don’t guarantee malfeasance.
“Higher tax rates merely increase the incentive to avoid taxation, they don’t guarantee malfeasance.”
From my point of view these are the same thing in current scenario.
”It is very much possible that agents merely choose not to work, as the cost of marginal effort is not sufficiently rewarded with enough marginal income.”
As I mentioned: “It is reasonable to assume that the tax is too high when working on a project capable of making you the wealthiest agent requires a couple of data centers and a government license. Furthermore, one shouldn’t overlook the law of large numbers: among the many agents, there are bound to be not only those who are willing but also those who are capable.”
So I suppose this may hold true in other situations as well, but in the AGI race, your future earnings depend heavily on current work.
In general, it is better to eliminate the economic incentives to operate as a secret lab.
The Laffer curve sloping downward (once past the optimal tax rate) does not require agents entering a shadow economy. It is very much possible that agents merely choose not to work, as the cost of marginal effort is not sufficiently rewarded with enough marginal income.
So in the specific example, there is no guarantee some secret agent must emerge. Higher tax rates merely increase the incentive to avoid taxation, they don’t guarantee malfeasance.
“Higher tax rates merely increase the incentive to avoid taxation, they don’t guarantee malfeasance.”
From my point of view these are the same thing in current scenario.
”It is very much possible that agents merely choose not to work, as the cost of marginal effort is not sufficiently rewarded with enough marginal income.”
As I mentioned: “It is reasonable to assume that the tax is too high when working on a project capable of making you the wealthiest agent requires a couple of data centers and a government license. Furthermore, one shouldn’t overlook the law of large numbers: among the many agents, there are bound to be not only those who are willing but also those who are capable.”
So I suppose this may hold true in other situations as well, but in the AGI race, your future earnings depend heavily on current work.
In general, it is better to eliminate the economic incentives to operate as a secret lab.