Notice the negotiation theory of Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement
If that sucks, you will expect your partner in this specific negotation to give you a bad deal (because it is still better than BATNA)
But if your alternative to this agreement is another agreement, now in that negotation your both your Atnas are bad. If you are forced to negotiate sequentially, you can never beat Batna by much.
For compliance with state rules (e.g., paying taxes), the BATNA is state-imposed violence (imprisonment), and it’s artificially created by the state. In this context, I’m not sure how productive the BATNA framework is in shedding more light on the situation.
Notice the negotiation theory of Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement
If that sucks, you will expect your partner in this specific negotation to give you a bad deal (because it is still better than BATNA)
But if your alternative to this agreement is another agreement, now in that negotation your both your Atnas are bad. If you are forced to negotiate sequentially, you can never beat Batna by much.
For compliance with state rules (e.g., paying taxes), the BATNA is state-imposed violence (imprisonment), and it’s artificially created by the state. In this context, I’m not sure how productive the BATNA framework is in shedding more light on the situation.