The terminology here is kind of catching me in between a rock and a hard place.
My entire point is that the “utility” of “utilitarianism” might need more complexity than the “utility” of economics, because if someone thinks they prefer a new toaster but they actually wouldn’t be any happier with it, I don’t place any importance on getting them a new toaster. IANAEBAFAIK economists’ utility either would get them the new toaster or doesn’t really consider this problem.
...but I also am afraid of straight out saying “Happiness!”, because if you do that you’re vulnerable to wireheading. Especially with a word like “hedon” which sounds like “hedonism”, which is very different from the “happiness” I want to talk about.
CEV might help here, but I do need to think about it more.
My entire point is that the “utility” of “utilitarianism” might need more complexity than the “utility” of economics, because if someone thinks they prefer a new toaster but they actually wouldn’t be any happier with it, I don’t place any importance on getting them a new toaster. IANAEBAFAIK economists’ utility either would get them the new toaster or doesn’t really consider this problem.
Agreed. For clarity, the economist’s utility is just preference sets, but these aren’t stable. Morality’s utility is what those preference sets would look like if they reflected what we would actually value, given that we take everything into account. I.e., Eliezer’s big computation. Utilitarianism’s utility, in the sense that Eliezer is a utilitarian, is the terms of the implied utility function we have (i.e., the big computation) that refers to the utility functions of other agents.
Using “utility” to refer to all of these things is confusing. I choose to call economist’s utility functions preference sets, for clarity. And, thus, economic actors maximize preferences, but not necessarily utility. Perhaps utilitarianism’s utility—the terms in our utility function for the values of other people—can be called altruistic utility, again, for clarity.
ETA: and happiness I use to refer to a psychological state—a feeling. Happiness, then, is nice, but I don’t want to be happy unless it’s appropriate to be happy. Your mileage may vary with this terminology, but it helps me keep things straight.
the “utility” of “utilitarianism” might need more complexity than the “utility” of economics
My rough impression is that “utilitarianism” is generally taken to mean either hedonistic or preference utilitarianism, but nothing else, and that we should be saying “consequentialism”.
CEV might help here, but I do need to think about it more.
I think the “big computation” perspective in The Meaning of Right is sufficient.
Or if you’re just looking for a term to use instead of “utility” or “happiness”, how about “goodness” or “the good”? (Edit: “value”, as steven suggests, is better.)
My rough impression is that “utilitarianism” is generally taken to mean either hedonistic or preference utilitarianism, but nothing else, and that we should be saying “consequentialism”.
My impression is that it doesn’t need to be pleasure or preference satisfaction; it can be anything that could be seen as “quality of life” or having one’s true “interests” satisfied.
Or if you’re just looking for a term to replace “utility”, how about “goodness” or “the good”?
The terminology here is kind of catching me in between a rock and a hard place.
My entire point is that the “utility” of “utilitarianism” might need more complexity than the “utility” of economics, because if someone thinks they prefer a new toaster but they actually wouldn’t be any happier with it, I don’t place any importance on getting them a new toaster. IANAEBAFAIK economists’ utility either would get them the new toaster or doesn’t really consider this problem.
...but I also am afraid of straight out saying “Happiness!”, because if you do that you’re vulnerable to wireheading. Especially with a word like “hedon” which sounds like “hedonism”, which is very different from the “happiness” I want to talk about.
CEV might help here, but I do need to think about it more.
Agreed. For clarity, the economist’s utility is just preference sets, but these aren’t stable. Morality’s utility is what those preference sets would look like if they reflected what we would actually value, given that we take everything into account. I.e., Eliezer’s big computation. Utilitarianism’s utility, in the sense that Eliezer is a utilitarian, is the terms of the implied utility function we have (i.e., the big computation) that refers to the utility functions of other agents.
Using “utility” to refer to all of these things is confusing. I choose to call economist’s utility functions preference sets, for clarity. And, thus, economic actors maximize preferences, but not necessarily utility. Perhaps utilitarianism’s utility—the terms in our utility function for the values of other people—can be called altruistic utility, again, for clarity.
ETA: and happiness I use to refer to a psychological state—a feeling. Happiness, then, is nice, but I don’t want to be happy unless it’s appropriate to be happy. Your mileage may vary with this terminology, but it helps me keep things straight.
My rough impression is that “utilitarianism” is generally taken to mean either hedonistic or preference utilitarianism, but nothing else, and that we should be saying “consequentialism”.
I think the “big computation” perspective in The Meaning of Right is sufficient.
Or if you’re just looking for a term to use instead of “utility” or “happiness”, how about “goodness” or “the good”? (Edit: “value”, as steven suggests, is better.)
My impression is that it doesn’t need to be pleasure or preference satisfaction; it can be anything that could be seen as “quality of life” or having one’s true “interests” satisfied.
Or “value”.
I agree we should care about more than people’s economic utility and more than people’s pleasure.
“eudaimon-seconds”, maybe?