We get some evidence that people value openness and financial transparency. This is vaguely useful for SIAI (they get evidence that the derivative of donations with respect to openness is probably slightly higher than they previously thought), but useless to anyone whose considering donating. What donors need to know is how good openness is, not how much other people value it. It also does nothing to address the good reasons for SIAI not to publish AGI progress; reasons which don’t apply to normal charities.
Also, he says you shouldn’t try to maximise expected utility. This could be a nit-pick, but your risk aversion should be factored into your utility function; you shouldn’t be risk averse in utility.
This could be a nit-pick, but your risk aversion should be factored into your utility function
Not according to Against Discount Rates …and I agree—though this may be a tangent.
I think these are two different things. I’d agree in opposing temporal discounting, but I’m not sure there’s anything (normatively) problematic about being risk-averse with money.
(Also, I believe Larks’s statement “your risk aversion should be factored into your utility function” didn’t mean to imply necessarily “you should be risk averse”; I just read it to mean “if you’re risk-averse, you don’t need to put that outside the framework of expected utility maximization, and decide not to always maximize expected utility; rather, your utility function itself can represent however much risk aversion you have”.)
We get some evidence that people value openness and financial transparency. This is vaguely useful for SIAI (they get evidence that the derivative of donations with respect to openness is probably slightly higher than they previously thought), but useless to anyone whose considering donating. What donors need to know is how good openness is, not how much other people value it. It also does nothing to address the good reasons for SIAI not to publish AGI progress; reasons which don’t apply to normal charities.
Also, he says you shouldn’t try to maximise expected utility. This could be a nit-pick, but your risk aversion should be factored into your utility function; you shouldn’t be risk averse in utility.
I added your suggestions, thanks.
=)
Not according to Against Discount Rates …and I agree—though this may be a tangent.
It is better if risk aversion is dynamically generated.
I think these are two different things. I’d agree in opposing temporal discounting, but I’m not sure there’s anything (normatively) problematic about being risk-averse with money.
(Also, I believe Larks’s statement “your risk aversion should be factored into your utility function” didn’t mean to imply necessarily “you should be risk averse”; I just read it to mean “if you’re risk-averse, you don’t need to put that outside the framework of expected utility maximization, and decide not to always maximize expected utility; rather, your utility function itself can represent however much risk aversion you have”.)