First, recursive statements (aka “going meta”) are powerful. As the history of mathematics teaches, seeking to restrict the ability to make recursive statements has enormous difficulty.
Second, recursive analysis of society (aka sociology) can provide very interesting insights, despite the fact that there is substantial social resistance to engaging in meta-level analysis. Hansonian signalling theory is a valuable perspective that could not be created without meta-level analysis of social behavior. Thus, lowing the resistance of the general population to meta-level analysis is relatively low-hanging fruit in raising the sanity line.
Most importantly, going meta often a mistake when trying to solve real-world problems. Going meta again is almost always a mistake. To be concrete, when I work as a lawyer, the actual meaning of the rules is usually the only important level of analysis. Sometimes, thinking about the policies that justify the rule is helpful. But thinking about the policies that justify having policies is pointless and unhelpful. In short, it is appropriate to be skeptical of assertions of the value of “going meta,” particularly assertions about the value of going “meta-meta.”
Most importantly, going meta often a mistake when trying to solve real-world problems. Going meta again is almost always a mistake.
This?
To be concrete, when I work as a lawyer, the actual meaning of the rules is usually the only important level of analysis.
It seems very plausible that going meta would be particularly unhelpful in a field that’s all about negotiating—and ensuring compliance with—precedent and explicit rules. Compare to a field where the problem that needs to be solved is one caused by precedent and explicit rules.
My main point was that meta-meta level (the part you didn’t quote) is very seldom useful in solving problems. My sense is that Will is too willing to go to that level.
I don’t agree with your point about what the practice of law is like, but that isn’t important. With certain types of problems, one level of meta is useful very frequently, with other types of problems much less so. It depends a lot on context. In particular circumstances, I think most thoughtful people could come to agreement on the usefulness of meta level analysis (i.e. policy arguments). But Will is particularly poorly calibrated on the usefulness of meta arguments. Most of society under-relies on meta-level analysis. Will seems to over-rely on it.
Most importantly, going meta often a mistake when trying to solve real-world problems. Going meta again is almost always a mistake.
I think your concept of “the real world” is insufficiently broad. I think there is a moral imperative to figure out morality, and I think figuring out morality requires going ridiculously meta—including asking deep questions like “what policies justify having policies?”. I think intelligent reflective people should spend as many hours as they can thinking about questions like these.
Perhaps now everyone can consider the “how meta should we go in our daily lives?” debate over—both sides have aired their opinions, and there’s not much else to do beyond that.
I agree that everyone ought to deeply think about deep questions at least long enough to come up with answers or have a satisfactory explanation of why no answers are there. But you only need to go through this process once. After you have the answers to these questions, there’s no call to continue thinking at this level unless you come to believe that the answers you found are wrong.
In short, there’s no reason to go seeking new deep answers unless you have reason to think your deep answers don’t work for you as well as they could. As I implied in my sanity line point, developing a sense of when that is happening is a valuable skill that most people simply don’t have. But meta-level thinking doesn’t develop that skill.
First, recursive statements (aka “going meta”) are powerful. As the history of mathematics teaches, seeking to restrict the ability to make recursive statements has enormous difficulty.
Second, recursive analysis of society (aka sociology) can provide very interesting insights, despite the fact that there is substantial social resistance to engaging in meta-level analysis. Hansonian signalling theory is a valuable perspective that could not be created without meta-level analysis of social behavior. Thus, lowing the resistance of the general population to meta-level analysis is relatively low-hanging fruit in raising the sanity line.
Most importantly, going meta often a mistake when trying to solve real-world problems. Going meta again is almost always a mistake.
To be concrete, when I work as a lawyer, the actual meaning of the rules is usually the only important level of analysis. Sometimes, thinking about the policies that justify the rule is helpful. But thinking about the policies that justify having policies is pointless and unhelpful. In short, it is appropriate to be skeptical of assertions of the value of “going meta,” particularly assertions about the value of going “meta-meta.”
Is your only evidence for this:
This?
It seems very plausible that going meta would be particularly unhelpful in a field that’s all about negotiating—and ensuring compliance with—precedent and explicit rules. Compare to a field where the problem that needs to be solved is one caused by precedent and explicit rules.
My main point was that meta-meta level (the part you didn’t quote) is very seldom useful in solving problems. My sense is that Will is too willing to go to that level.
I don’t agree with your point about what the practice of law is like, but that isn’t important. With certain types of problems, one level of meta is useful very frequently, with other types of problems much less so. It depends a lot on context. In particular circumstances, I think most thoughtful people could come to agreement on the usefulness of meta level analysis (i.e. policy arguments). But Will is particularly poorly calibrated on the usefulness of meta arguments. Most of society under-relies on meta-level analysis. Will seems to over-rely on it.
How would you know how well I’m calibrated?
I think your concept of “the real world” is insufficiently broad. I think there is a moral imperative to figure out morality, and I think figuring out morality requires going ridiculously meta—including asking deep questions like “what policies justify having policies?”. I think intelligent reflective people should spend as many hours as they can thinking about questions like these.
Perhaps now everyone can consider the “how meta should we go in our daily lives?” debate over—both sides have aired their opinions, and there’s not much else to do beyond that.
I agree that everyone ought to deeply think about deep questions at least long enough to come up with answers or have a satisfactory explanation of why no answers are there. But you only need to go through this process once. After you have the answers to these questions, there’s no call to continue thinking at this level unless you come to believe that the answers you found are wrong.
In short, there’s no reason to go seeking new deep answers unless you have reason to think your deep answers don’t work for you as well as they could. As I implied in my sanity line point, developing a sense of when that is happening is a valuable skill that most people simply don’t have. But meta-level thinking doesn’t develop that skill.