As I understand this, the rough sketch of this approach is basically to realize that incomplete preferences are compatible with a family of utility functions rather than a single one (since they don’t specify how to trade-off between incomparable outcomes), and that you can use randomization to select within this family (implemented via contracts), thereby narrowing in on completed preferences / a utility function. Is that description on track?
If so, is it a problem that the subagents/committee/market may have preferences that are a function of this dealmaking process, like preferences about avoiding the coordination/transaction costs involved, or preferences about how to do randomization? Like, couldn’t you end up with a situation where “completing the preferences” is dispreferred, such that the individual subagents do not choose to aggregate into a single utility maximizer?
As I understand this, the rough sketch of this approach is basically to realize that incomplete preferences are compatible with a family of utility functions rather than a single one (since they don’t specify how to trade-off between incomparable outcomes), and that you can use randomization to select within this family (implemented via contracts), thereby narrowing in on completed preferences / a utility function. Is that description on track?
If so, is it a problem that the subagents/committee/market may have preferences that are a function of this dealmaking process, like preferences about avoiding the coordination/transaction costs involved, or preferences about how to do randomization? Like, couldn’t you end up with a situation where “completing the preferences” is dispreferred, such that the individual subagents do not choose to aggregate into a single utility maximizer?