You seem to be trying to, somewhat independently of the way it is done in science and mathematics typically, arrive at distinct concepts of accurate, precise, and predictive. At least how I’m using them, these terms can each describe a theory.
Precise—well defined and repeatable, with little or no error.
Accurate—descriptive of reality, as far as we know.
Predictive—we can extend this theory to describe new results accurately.
A theory can be any of these things, on different domains, to different degrees. A mathematical theory is precise*, but that need not make it accurate or predictive. It’s of course a dangerous mistake to conflate these properties, or even to extend them beyond the domains on which they apply, when using a theory. Which is why these form part of the foundation of scientific method.
*There’s a caveat here, but that would be an entire different discussion.
And this is not just an abstract issue. The fact that predictiveness has almost nothing to do with accuracy, in the sense of correspondence is one of the outstanding problems with physicalism.
You seem to be trying to, somewhat independently of the way it is done in science and mathematics typically, arrive at distinct concepts of accurate, precise, and predictive. At least how I’m using them, these terms can each describe a theory.
Precise—well defined and repeatable, with little or no error.
Accurate—descriptive of reality, as far as we know.
Predictive—we can extend this theory to describe new results accurately.
A theory can be any of these things, on different domains, to different degrees. A mathematical theory is precise*, but that need not make it accurate or predictive. It’s of course a dangerous mistake to conflate these properties, or even to extend them beyond the domains on which they apply, when using a theory. Which is why these form part of the foundation of scientific method.
*There’s a caveat here, but that would be an entire different discussion.
And this is not just an abstract issue. The fact that predictiveness has almost nothing to do with accuracy, in the sense of correspondence is one of the outstanding problems with physicalism.