I can’t see how our tools for learning the answer to this question would be in anyway different from our general scientific tools. Metaphysics, such as we can say anything at all about it, is just an extension of science.
Depending upon what you mean by ‘science’, this statement could range from trivially true to … not true.
If by science you mean ‘ways of knowing’, then it is true; metaphysics is just an extension of science. However, scientific principles we’ve learned in X don’t necessarily apply to X’. The rules in X’ could be very strange, and not logical in physically logical ways. (My opinion is that they still need to be mathematically logical.)
Why not just assume these were features of X to begin with? If I see an temporal, spatial or logical inconsistency I’m going to revise my understanding of space, time and logic in X. Not posit X’.
It has to be an inconsistency that is not resolvable in X.
Depending upon what you mean by ‘science’, this statement could range from trivially true to … not true.
I mean scientific epistemology of which I take Bayesian epistemology to be an idealized form. We update our probability distributions for all logically consistent hypotheses based on predictive accuracy, capacity, parsimony and some other pragmatic tie-breaker criteria. This is the same formula we should apply to metaphysics. However, the nature of the beast is that most of the work that should done in metaphysics involves clearing the way for physics, biology, chemistry, psychology etc., not advancing a view with particular predictions that should be tested. Basically we’re asking: what is a good way to think about the world?
Now it could be that there is some place, domain or mode where physicalist metaphysics is bad, counterproductive, unexplanatory etc. Then it makes sense to try to give an account of metaphysics that makes sense of this place domain or mode while not losing the advantages physicalism provides elsewhere. A kludgey way of doing this is just to claim that there are different ‘magisterium’, one where physics defines our most basic ontology and another which is better described with some other theory. This other theory could be surprising and strange. But we still determine what that other theory looks like based on our scientific epistemology and the fact that we are using two different theories needs to be justified by our scientific epistemology.
It has to be an inconsistency that is not resolvable in X.
I have a lot of trouble imagining how this could happen. Our physical concepts are incredibly flexible. Would asking for an example be insane of me?
Nevermind. I got part (b) and part (c) confused. Example of temporal, spatial or logical inconsistencies (possible but not actual) forthcoming.
I have a lot of trouble imagining how this could happen. Our physical concepts are incredibly flexible. Would asking for an example be insane of me?
I gave 3. (The existence of truly random phenomenon, objective value, or a dual component to consciousness would all be inconsistent with X.) Did you even read my comment? I realize it was really long..
I leave the keys to my office on the counter, and realize this when I get to work. Damn, I need my keys! Maybe I left them in my car. Phew, there they are. I get home after work and there are my keys on the counter, just where I left them. So how did I get in my office? Well, shrug, I did.
More whimsical example:
Your name is Mario and it’s your job to save the princess. You’ve got 323 coins and then you see: a black pixel.
Depending upon what you mean by ‘science’, this statement could range from trivially true to … not true.
If by science you mean ‘ways of knowing’, then it is true; metaphysics is just an extension of science. However, scientific principles we’ve learned in X don’t necessarily apply to X’. The rules in X’ could be very strange, and not logical in physically logical ways. (My opinion is that they still need to be mathematically logical.)
It has to be an inconsistency that is not resolvable in X.
I mean scientific epistemology of which I take Bayesian epistemology to be an idealized form. We update our probability distributions for all logically consistent hypotheses based on predictive accuracy, capacity, parsimony and some other pragmatic tie-breaker criteria. This is the same formula we should apply to metaphysics. However, the nature of the beast is that most of the work that should done in metaphysics involves clearing the way for physics, biology, chemistry, psychology etc., not advancing a view with particular predictions that should be tested. Basically we’re asking: what is a good way to think about the world?
Now it could be that there is some place, domain or mode where physicalist metaphysics is bad, counterproductive, unexplanatory etc. Then it makes sense to try to give an account of metaphysics that makes sense of this place domain or mode while not losing the advantages physicalism provides elsewhere. A kludgey way of doing this is just to claim that there are different ‘magisterium’, one where physics defines our most basic ontology and another which is better described with some other theory. This other theory could be surprising and strange. But we still determine what that other theory looks like based on our scientific epistemology and the fact that we are using two different theories needs to be justified by our scientific epistemology.
I have a lot of trouble imagining how this could happen. Our physical concepts are incredibly flexible. Would asking for an example be insane of me?
Nevermind. I got part (b) and part (c) confused. Example of temporal, spatial or logical inconsistencies (possible but not actual) forthcoming.
I gave 3. (The existence of truly random phenomenon, objective value, or a dual component to consciousness would all be inconsistent with X.) Did you even read my comment? I realize it was really long..
First example:
I leave the keys to my office on the counter, and realize this when I get to work. Damn, I need my keys! Maybe I left them in my car. Phew, there they are. I get home after work and there are my keys on the counter, just where I left them. So how did I get in my office? Well, shrug, I did.
More whimsical example:
Your name is Mario and it’s your job to save the princess. You’ve got 323 coins and then you see: a black pixel.