One thing that I got from the Sequences is that you can’t just not assign a probability to an event—I think of this as a core insight of Bayesian rationality. I seem to remember an article in the Sequences about this where Eliezer describes a conversation in which he is challenged to assign a probability to the number of leaves on a particular tree, or the surname of the person walking past the window. But I can’t find this article now—can anyone point me to it? Thanks!
This may be related to the recent post Study: Making decisions makes you tired. It seems plausible that we don’t assign probabilities to events until we have to, in order to make a decision, and that’s why making decisions is tiring.
One thing that I got from the Sequences is that you can’t just not assign a probability to an event—I think of this as a core insight of Bayesian rationality. I seem to remember an article in the Sequences about this where Eliezer describes a conversation in which he is challenged to assign a probability to the number of leaves on a particular tree, or the surname of the person walking past the window. But I can’t find this article now—can anyone point me to it? Thanks!
http://lesswrong.com/lw/gs/i_dont_know/
http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/I_don%27t_know
That’s exactly it—thanks!
This may be related to the recent post Study: Making decisions makes you tired. It seems plausible that we don’t assign probabilities to events until we have to, in order to make a decision, and that’s why making decisions is tiring.