If we use a trivial definition of “preference,” as I do in this post, then I believe that yes, we would have to say that bonsai is something akin to torture.
But I also think this unqualified designation of preference as the criterium for moral obligation is very much incomplete. Having some moral obligation toward plants seems intuitive to me (even if the obligation is low?), but having moral obligation toward e.g. a steam engine seems very weird! I have not fully formulated a better qualification yet, but I suspect it will be something like requiring that an entity has a world model, allowing for internalized, negentropic goals/preferences (i.e, expressed preference is insufficient for moral obligation). At some point this just becomes a round-about way of saying “agency” is required for moral obligation, but perhaps there’s a pared down version of agency which is easier to verify.
If we use a trivial definition of “preference,” as I do in this post, then I believe that yes, we would have to say that bonsai is something akin to torture.
But I also think this unqualified designation of preference as the criterium for moral obligation is very much incomplete. Having some moral obligation toward plants seems intuitive to me (even if the obligation is low?), but having moral obligation toward e.g. a steam engine seems very weird! I have not fully formulated a better qualification yet, but I suspect it will be something like requiring that an entity has a world model, allowing for internalized, negentropic goals/preferences (i.e, expressed preference is insufficient for moral obligation). At some point this just becomes a round-about way of saying “agency” is required for moral obligation, but perhaps there’s a pared down version of agency which is easier to verify.