I think the simple answer is right there in the opening paragraph—those who bring a moral agent into existence bear responsibility for its actions and its suffering, and those who had no part in doing so do not. If someone bred several thousand pugs into existence, the onus would be on them to perform the surgeries to alleviate their medical complications. Similarly, an AI company that built a machine capable of suffering would be obligated to allocate its resources towards mitigating that suffering, but the rest of us would not be. Humanity isn’t a single moral actor, after all.
There are some interesting duty of care arguments put forward by Clare Palmer surrounding animal rights that could be applied here. There is an argument to be made that whoever benefits from such AIs is also on the hook for alleviating their suffering, even if they didn’t cause it in the first place. For example, if you benefit from a violet-averting household helper, you have a duty of care to it.
I think some of the other interesting questions surround tradeoffs in moral hijacking scenarios. What novel sources of suffering are acceptable to create in AIs in the first place?
I think the simple answer is right there in the opening paragraph—those who bring a moral agent into existence bear responsibility for its actions and its suffering, and those who had no part in doing so do not. If someone bred several thousand pugs into existence, the onus would be on them to perform the surgeries to alleviate their medical complications. Similarly, an AI company that built a machine capable of suffering would be obligated to allocate its resources towards mitigating that suffering, but the rest of us would not be. Humanity isn’t a single moral actor, after all.
There are some interesting duty of care arguments put forward by Clare Palmer surrounding animal rights that could be applied here. There is an argument to be made that whoever benefits from such AIs is also on the hook for alleviating their suffering, even if they didn’t cause it in the first place. For example, if you benefit from a violet-averting household helper, you have a duty of care to it.
I think some of the other interesting questions surround tradeoffs in moral hijacking scenarios. What novel sources of suffering are acceptable to create in AIs in the first place?