Kind of. If you have data but don’t share it, you can’t publish off of it either. And there are grant monitors. If you’re ordering the reagents for several times the sequencing you’re putting up in the bank, they may well ask questions. Some are more assiduous than others, but do you want to take that chance?
Lessdazed and I are talking about the sharing of utility functions honestly, which is something of a different game than deciding whether to defect on a a cooperative agreement that already has enforcement mechanism in place.
My point was that if it is a Pareto optimum which is going to be implemented then the ‘defection’ would be in providing a utility function constructed in whatever way would make the calculated pareto optimum closest to your actual utility function. Talking up, understating or outright falsifying your desires in a negotiation is common practice.
In this particular case, then, I don’t see what lies they could have profitably told. The situation was very symmetric, and falsifications of the utility function would kind of stand out.
In other cases, yes, that’s a problem. In the case where everyone can verify what everyone really needs or normatively should need*, then this works a lot better.
*I mean the case where, say, a company would benefit from more secrecy, but only at the cost of keeping effective medicines off the market. If they object on the ground of profit, the rest of the community can rightly give them the finger. And any alternative justifications for secrecy they offer will be subjected to additional scrutiny because everyone can see how it’d benefit them specially.
Kind of. If you have data but don’t share it, you can’t publish off of it either. And there are grant monitors. If you’re ordering the reagents for several times the sequencing you’re putting up in the bank, they may well ask questions. Some are more assiduous than others, but do you want to take that chance?
Lessdazed and I are talking about the sharing of utility functions honestly, which is something of a different game than deciding whether to defect on a a cooperative agreement that already has enforcement mechanism in place.
My point was that if it is a Pareto optimum which is going to be implemented then the ‘defection’ would be in providing a utility function constructed in whatever way would make the calculated pareto optimum closest to your actual utility function. Talking up, understating or outright falsifying your desires in a negotiation is common practice.
Ah, yes. Thanks for clearing that up.
In this particular case, then, I don’t see what lies they could have profitably told. The situation was very symmetric, and falsifications of the utility function would kind of stand out.
In other cases, yes, that’s a problem. In the case where everyone can verify what everyone really needs or normatively should need*, then this works a lot better.
*I mean the case where, say, a company would benefit from more secrecy, but only at the cost of keeping effective medicines off the market. If they object on the ground of profit, the rest of the community can rightly give them the finger. And any alternative justifications for secrecy they offer will be subjected to additional scrutiny because everyone can see how it’d benefit them specially.
And one of the reasons to avoid other optimising.