I think that’s the strongest move. Faith as allegiance, trust, submission, etc.
There has always been a fundamental equivocation in “Faith in God”, which most atheists mistake only as “Belief that some being exists”, and not “choose to trust and obey God”.
When you combine that with our notion of instrumental rationality and rationality as winning, you have a clear path to the rationality of faith in God: Choosing to trust in God and submit to God leads to winning.
I recall a Christian gal I knew in high school saying “I just concluded that I would have a happier life if I believed in God.” At the time, that struck me as blasphemous. I was appalled. You believe it without regard to correspondence to reality? Self willed delusion? But once one no longer makes a fetish of epsitemic truth, it’s perfectly sensible.
you have a clear path to the rationality of faith in God: Choosing to trust in God and submit to God leads to winning.
Do you in fact believe that to be true? (For the avoidance of doubt, I mean: do you believe that it corresponds to reality?)
once one no longer makes a fetish of epistemic truth
The word “fetish” has a value judgement built in (e.g., the relevant definition in the OED is “something irrationally reverenced”), and I don’t see any reason to agree with that value judgement. If we rewrite your statement without that inbuilt sneering, here’s what we get.
[...] You believe it without regard to correspondence to reality? [...] But once one stops caring about whether one’s beliefs correspond to reality, it’s perfectly sensible.
And, yeah, if you don’t care whether your beliefs correspond to reality then you won’t be bothered by someone else not caring whether their beliefs correspond to reality, and that may be convenient sometimes. But on the whole I am inclined to agree with Eliezer that “not making a fetish of epistemic truth” is a bad strategy overall.
Also, if it becomes known that to you truth is only a matter of strategy, no one is ever going to trust anything you say ever again. I asked you a question above, but no matter what answer you give I am going to harbour a suspicion that the question you’re really answering is more like “which answer will produce results I like better?”.
I don’t think this is entirely fair to the point buybuydandavis was making. By “making a fetish of epistemic truth,” I don’t think he meant not caring about truth at all, but not putting it above everything else. In reality, everyone cares about truth, but they also care about other things. And that means that our actions are going to be affected by our concern about truth, but they will also be affected by our concerns about other things.
This includes actions like making statements. And no one is exempt from this, because everyone cares about more than one thing. If someone says they care only about truth and nothing else, it is untrue, and in fact is an example of its own untruth, because the person who makes this untrue claim must be motivated by something other than truth in making the claim.
I care a lot about truth, and more than most people do, as far as I can see. But that does not mean that I don’t care about other things. I do, and those other motives can and do affect my statements and beliefs, even if I try to minimize those effects. Certainly I would be unwilling to adopt a false worldview for the sake of other motives. But if someone else cares a bit less about truth than I do, and a bit more about other things, and consequently accept a false worldview for the sake of those other things, I am not horrified by that, even if I would be unwilling to do it myself. In that sense I find the statement by buybuydandavis’s friend understandable.
In a similar way, “truth is only a matter of strategy” is probably not entirely true of anyone. But everyone is going to have their statements affected by their other motives to some degree, and in that sense I am suspicious of everyone’s statements, including my own, much in the way you say here.
I don’t think he meant not caring about truth at all
Sure. Neither, in fact, do I. But let’s be clear: the question was never just “should we care about truth more than everything else?” but “should we care about truth more than anything else when deciding what to believe?” and I think answering no is much more reasonable in the first case than the second. Prioritizing truth when deciding what to believe is no more “fetishizing” than prioritizing minimal aberration when having eyeglasses made, or prioritizing drinkability when arranging your town’s water supply. You may pay some attention to price or aesthetics, but you’d generally be crazy to get lenses that don’t actually do a reasonable job of correcting your vision or drinking water that will poison you.
Instances where you ‘trust and obey’ something without regard to its epistemic truth but seeking something else out of that ‘trust’ or ‘faith’ should arguably be regarded as aliefs, not beliefs. So is it rational to alieve in a god? Well, the answer will probably depend on what your goals are and what god, or gods, you’re alieving in at any given moment. If you’re part of a group of warriors trying to enter some kind of collective berserker-like frenzy, it may be rational to alieve in a warlike deity like Mars, Thor or (at some level, at least) the Abrahamic god/Yahweh. But maybe you have other goals, and you’d do best by placing your faith in an entirely different deity.
It may help to point out which conception of faith you have in mind. For example:
faith as a feeling of existential confidence
faith as knowledge of specific truths, revealed by God
faith as belief that God exists
faith as belief in (trust in) God
faith as practical commitment beyond the evidence to one’s belief that God exists
faith as practical commitment without belief
faith as hoping—or acting in the hope that—the God who saves exists
etc...
I think that’s the strongest move. Faith as allegiance, trust, submission, etc.
There has always been a fundamental equivocation in “Faith in God”, which most atheists mistake only as “Belief that some being exists”, and not “choose to trust and obey God”.
When you combine that with our notion of instrumental rationality and rationality as winning, you have a clear path to the rationality of faith in God:
Choosing to trust in God and submit to God leads to winning.
I recall a Christian gal I knew in high school saying “I just concluded that I would have a happier life if I believed in God.” At the time, that struck me as blasphemous. I was appalled. You believe it without regard to correspondence to reality? Self willed delusion? But once one no longer makes a fetish of epsitemic truth, it’s perfectly sensible.
Do you in fact believe that to be true? (For the avoidance of doubt, I mean: do you believe that it corresponds to reality?)
The word “fetish” has a value judgement built in (e.g., the relevant definition in the OED is “something irrationally reverenced”), and I don’t see any reason to agree with that value judgement. If we rewrite your statement without that inbuilt sneering, here’s what we get.
And, yeah, if you don’t care whether your beliefs correspond to reality then you won’t be bothered by someone else not caring whether their beliefs correspond to reality, and that may be convenient sometimes. But on the whole I am inclined to agree with Eliezer that “not making a fetish of epistemic truth” is a bad strategy overall.
Also, if it becomes known that to you truth is only a matter of strategy, no one is ever going to trust anything you say ever again. I asked you a question above, but no matter what answer you give I am going to harbour a suspicion that the question you’re really answering is more like “which answer will produce results I like better?”.
I don’t think this is entirely fair to the point buybuydandavis was making. By “making a fetish of epistemic truth,” I don’t think he meant not caring about truth at all, but not putting it above everything else. In reality, everyone cares about truth, but they also care about other things. And that means that our actions are going to be affected by our concern about truth, but they will also be affected by our concerns about other things.
This includes actions like making statements. And no one is exempt from this, because everyone cares about more than one thing. If someone says they care only about truth and nothing else, it is untrue, and in fact is an example of its own untruth, because the person who makes this untrue claim must be motivated by something other than truth in making the claim.
I care a lot about truth, and more than most people do, as far as I can see. But that does not mean that I don’t care about other things. I do, and those other motives can and do affect my statements and beliefs, even if I try to minimize those effects. Certainly I would be unwilling to adopt a false worldview for the sake of other motives. But if someone else cares a bit less about truth than I do, and a bit more about other things, and consequently accept a false worldview for the sake of those other things, I am not horrified by that, even if I would be unwilling to do it myself. In that sense I find the statement by buybuydandavis’s friend understandable.
In a similar way, “truth is only a matter of strategy” is probably not entirely true of anyone. But everyone is going to have their statements affected by their other motives to some degree, and in that sense I am suspicious of everyone’s statements, including my own, much in the way you say here.
Winner.
Sure. Neither, in fact, do I. But let’s be clear: the question was never just “should we care about truth more than everything else?” but “should we care about truth more than anything else when deciding what to believe?” and I think answering no is much more reasonable in the first case than the second. Prioritizing truth when deciding what to believe is no more “fetishizing” than prioritizing minimal aberration when having eyeglasses made, or prioritizing drinkability when arranging your town’s water supply. You may pay some attention to price or aesthetics, but you’d generally be crazy to get lenses that don’t actually do a reasonable job of correcting your vision or drinking water that will poison you.
I consider prioritizing truth over winning as fetishiizing truth.
Sometimes.
And sometimes you pick the wrong god.
And sometimes you get burned at the stake as a heretic, anyway.
By “path to the rationality of faith in God”, I meant “an argument you can make for the rationality of faith in God”.
I’m not saying that’s a slam dunk or anything, but I can see a plausible argument for it.
Yes, sometimes yes, and sometimes no. A convincing argument would not require a guaranteed road to winning.
Instances where you ‘trust and obey’ something without regard to its epistemic truth but seeking something else out of that ‘trust’ or ‘faith’ should arguably be regarded as aliefs, not beliefs. So is it rational to alieve in a god? Well, the answer will probably depend on what your goals are and what god, or gods, you’re alieving in at any given moment. If you’re part of a group of warriors trying to enter some kind of collective berserker-like frenzy, it may be rational to alieve in a warlike deity like Mars, Thor or (at some level, at least) the Abrahamic god/Yahweh. But maybe you have other goals, and you’d do best by placing your faith in an entirely different deity.