I’m not entirely sure what you’re saying. Is it that poor people can use the same contract structure by just reducing the money they pledge according to how the utility is weighted?
So, if, say, someone making $3000/month (say expenses leave them with $1000 after all is said and done) is trying commitment contracts, it’d be reasonable for them to pledge $1000, or maybe $500 if their savings are in dire straights, but someone making $1000 a month (who is probably in debt at the end of the month) should still find a monetary value greater than $0.00 that they can justify pledging? What if someone has net negative income, where the value of overcoming akrasia might be the difference between bankrupsy and financial stability, but the money they have available to pledge would come out of there “please don’t take everything I own that could possibly get me back into the economy” fund, where failure would be the difference between inescapable poverty and the (still crappy but slightly less so) status quo? I’m assuming pledging negative money on failure is obviously not allowed.
Diminishing marginal utility of money applies on both sides of the equation to the same degree. To whatever extent this motivation strategy is prejudiced against ‘poor people’ the disadvantage is mediated by psychological profiles associated with that class, not by the micro-economic incentives present. This does not mean that the problem is unimportant but it is important not to conflate the two. This comment is a (minor and entirely non-offensive) misuse of moral authority.
NOTE: I’m not advocating financial commitment contracts for poor people. I’m not advocating financial commitment contracts at all, for anyone. They do work for some people but I know my psychology well enough to know that they have a toxic influence on me personally if I try that style of influence on myself. People can and should do whatever works for them. But I’ll leave championing commitment contracts to someone who likes them. (I’d rather champion, say, self rewards strategies for ugh field removal.)
I’m not entirely sure what you’re saying. Is it that poor people can use the same contract structure by just reducing the money they pledge according to how the utility is weighted?
So, if, say, someone making $3000/month (say expenses leave them with $1000 after all is said and done) is trying commitment contracts, it’d be reasonable for them to pledge $1000, or maybe $500 if their savings are in dire straights, but someone making $1000 a month (who is probably in debt at the end of the month) should still find a monetary value greater than $0.00 that they can justify pledging? What if someone has net negative income, where the value of overcoming akrasia might be the difference between bankrupsy and financial stability, but the money they have available to pledge would come out of there “please don’t take everything I own that could possibly get me back into the economy” fund, where failure would be the difference between inescapable poverty and the (still crappy but slightly less so) status quo? I’m assuming pledging negative money on failure is obviously not allowed.
Diminishing marginal utility of money applies on both sides of the equation to the same degree. To whatever extent this motivation strategy is prejudiced against ‘poor people’ the disadvantage is mediated by psychological profiles associated with that class, not by the micro-economic incentives present. This does not mean that the problem is unimportant but it is important not to conflate the two. This comment is a (minor and entirely non-offensive) misuse of moral authority.
NOTE: I’m not advocating financial commitment contracts for poor people. I’m not advocating financial commitment contracts at all, for anyone. They do work for some people but I know my psychology well enough to know that they have a toxic influence on me personally if I try that style of influence on myself. People can and should do whatever works for them. But I’ll leave championing commitment contracts to someone who likes them. (I’d rather champion, say, self rewards strategies for ugh field removal.)