Perhaps communication of a fact requires the use of a theory; but this does not imply that the fact itself is somehow “theory-laden”. (Maybe the latter is also the case, but the former doesn’t imply it.)
Well, the word ‘fact’ tends to refer ambiguously to two things: first to the apple’s being green, and second to the intensional, semantic object ‘the apple is green’. I intended the second meaning. These kinds of facts, I’m saying, have to get excluded from the ‘normal’. The other, former kind of fact have no place in any theory, since they’re just the way the world is. I do think the wiki article on the normality of reality is based on an equivocation between these two senses of ‘fact’.
Anyway, the question is whether or not facts of the intensional semantic sort could belong to ‘normality’. If not (so goes the line of reasoning) then the only thing we can include in normality are statements of appearance and seeming. But this, I think, makes Egan’s law trivial.
Well, the word ‘fact’ tends to refer ambiguously to two things: first to the apple’s being green, and second to the intensional, semantic object ‘the apple is green’. I intended the second meaning. These kinds of facts, I’m saying, have to get excluded from the ‘normal’. The other, former kind of fact have no place in any theory, since they’re just the way the world is. I do think the wiki article on the normality of reality is based on an equivocation between these two senses of ‘fact’.
Anyway, the question is whether or not facts of the intensional semantic sort could belong to ‘normality’. If not (so goes the line of reasoning) then the only thing we can include in normality are statements of appearance and seeming. But this, I think, makes Egan’s law trivial.