Epistemic rationality is just one of many means available for winning. There will be trade offs between these means, first in terms of opportunity costs, but second where being employing the means is a handicap in a situation. Under totalitarian theocracy, it’s likely instrumentally rational to believe in the Great Gazoo with the rest of them. In general, there are costs in not aligning your beliefs to the society you live in, even when those beliefs are false. Whether the benefit of more accurate prediction from epistemic rationality outweighs those costs is a factual matter of the situation.
Epistemic rationality is just one of many means available for winning. There will be trade offs between these means
I am not interested in these tradeoffs, or in whatever imagined situations where it would hypothetically be better to be dull and ignorant. If LessWrong is about anything, it is about epistemic rationality and its employment for instrumental rationality.
I am not interested in these tradeoffs, or in whatever imagined situations where it would hypothetically be better to be dull and ignorant.
I’m interested. I’m even interested in what aspect of instrumental rationality is served by renouncing epistemic rationality on the question of the limits of epistemic rationality to serve instrumental ends.
Epistemic rationality is just one of many means available for winning. There will be trade offs between these means, first in terms of opportunity costs, but second where being employing the means is a handicap in a situation. Under totalitarian theocracy, it’s likely instrumentally rational to believe in the Great Gazoo with the rest of them. In general, there are costs in not aligning your beliefs to the society you live in, even when those beliefs are false. Whether the benefit of more accurate prediction from epistemic rationality outweighs those costs is a factual matter of the situation.
I am not interested in these tradeoffs, or in whatever imagined situations where it would hypothetically be better to be dull and ignorant. If LessWrong is about anything, it is about epistemic rationality and its employment for instrumental rationality.
I’m interested. I’m even interested in what aspect of instrumental rationality is served by renouncing epistemic rationality on the question of the limits of epistemic rationality to serve instrumental ends.