Values/desires that arise in human-level practice are probably not terminal. It’s possible to introspect on them much further than we are capable of, so it’s probable that some of them are wrong and/or irrelevant (their domain of applicability doesn’t include the alternative states of affairs that are more valuable, or they have to be reformulated beyond any recognition to remain applicable).
For example, something like well-being of persons is not obviously relevant in more optimal configurations (if it turns out that not having persons is better, or their “well-being” is less important than other considerations), even if it’s probably important in the current situation (and for that we only have human desires/intuitions and approval of human introspection). Some variant of that is clearly instrumentally important though, to realize terminal values, whatever they turn out to be. (See also.)
One term for the “really terminal” values is “idealized values”.
Values/desires that arise in human-level practice are probably not terminal. It’s possible to introspect on them much further than we are capable of, so it’s probable that some of them are wrong and/or irrelevant (their domain of applicability doesn’t include the alternative states of affairs that are more valuable, or they have to be reformulated beyond any recognition to remain applicable).
For example, something like well-being of persons is not obviously relevant in more optimal configurations (if it turns out that not having persons is better, or their “well-being” is less important than other considerations), even if it’s probably important in the current situation (and for that we only have human desires/intuitions and approval of human introspection). Some variant of that is clearly instrumentally important though, to realize terminal values, whatever they turn out to be. (See also.)
One term for the “really terminal” values is “idealized values”.