I agree that falsifiability is not a complete definition. My point was only that falsifiability is not applicable to the principle of falsifiability, any more than it applies to mathematics.
Yes. Falsifiability is a poor definition of science and is self-undermining in the sense that it can’t pass its own test.
That said, Newton’s physics and geocentric theories are false. Are they not science simply for that reason?
Of course not. I’m not claiming a scientific theory must be true. I’m claiming that known falseness (which implies falsifiability) is not a sufficient condition for being scientific.
A theory that does not constrain experience (“God works in mysterious ways”) is not a scientific theory because it can explain any occurrence and is therefore not falsifiable.
That statement does not itself constrain experience. That’s not a useful critique of the statement.
I’m claiming that known falseness (which implies falsifiability) is not a sufficient condition for being scientific.
Know falseness is not really same thing as falsifiability. Known falseness is useless in deciding whether a theory is scientific. Both the Greek pantheon and geocentric theories are known to be false.
Falsifiability is simply the requirement that a scientific theory to list things that can’t happen under that theory. Falsifiability says scientific theory don’t look for evidence in support, they look for evidence to test the theory.
The fact that no false statements appear doesn’t mean that the scientific theory isn’t falsifiable. The fact that every statement of a theory has been true does not mean that the theory is falsifiable.
That statement does not itself constrain experience. That’s not a useful critique of the statement.
That doesn’t seem true. The statement seems to perfectly constrain experience: you will not experience situations where theories which do not constrain experience will still be falsified.
And indeed, watching the world go by over the years, I see theories like ‘Christianity’ or ‘psychoanalysis’ which do not constrain experience at all have yet to be falsified—exactly as predicted.
Fine, you want to be contrary. What experience would falsify the partial definition of scientific theory that I have labelled “the principle of falsifiability”? If no such experience exists, does this call into doubt the usefulness of the principle?
What experience would falsify the partial definition of scientific theory that I have labelled “the principle of falsifiability”?
Are you even trying here? Here’s what would falsify falsifiability: observing superior predictions being made by unfalsifiable theories, theories which have no reason to work but which do. Imagine a Christianity which came with texts loaded with prophetic symbolism which could be interpreted any way and is unfalsifiable, but which nevertheless keep turning out literally true (writes my hypothetical self, as he is tormented by Satanic wasps with the faces of humans prior to the sea turning into blood or something like that). In such a universe, falsifiability would be pretty useless.
Isn’t that essentially the best case for things like Nostradamus? Even assuming that the prophecies are accurate, they aren’t useful because they are so vague. The moment that the predictions are specific enough to be useful, they could be falsified.
What use is it to call that science? How could it possibly produce superior predictions in a world in which science works at all?
I don’t understand where we disagree, so let me clarify my position: A prophecy that is so vague that it can’t be disproved is so vague that it doesn’t tell you what will happen ahead of time. Calling that a prediction abuses the term to the point of incoherency.
Yes, that’s almost entirely a definitional point. Definitions aren’t necessarily empirical statements. They are either useful or not useful in thinking carefully. Thus, the fact that they cannot be falsified is not a relevant thing to say, in the same way that it isn’t useful to object that the Pythagorean theory can’t be falsified.
Know falseness is not really same thing as falsifiability. Known falseness is useless in deciding whether a theory is scientific. Both the Greek pantheon and geocentric theories are known to be false.
Falsifiability is simply the requirement that a scientific theory to list things that can’t happen under that theory. Falsifiability says scientific theory don’t look for evidence in support, they look for evidence to test the theory.
The fact that no false statements appear doesn’t mean that the scientific theory isn’t falsifiable. The fact that every statement of a theory has been true does not mean that the theory is falsifiable.
Nothing in this reply contradicts anything I have asserted. I was merely claiming that if falsifiability is a sufficient condition for a hypothesis to be “scientific”, then all theories known to be false are scientific (because if we know they are false, then they must be falsifiable). I’m not being contrarian; I’m pointing out a deductive consequence of the very definition of falsifiability that you linked to. Hopefully this closes the inferential distance:
If a hypothesis is falsifiable, then it is scientific.
If a hypothesis is known to be false, then it is falsifiable.
Therefore, if a hypothesis is known to be false then it is scientific.
I am merely denying the first premise via reductio ad absurdum, because the conclusion is obviously false (and the second premise isn’t). If you took my claim to be something other than this, then you have simply misread me.
That’s much clearer. I didn’t intend to assert that falsifiability was a sufficient condition for a theory being scientific, only that it is a necessary condition. That’s what I mean by saying it was a partial definition.
Thus, I don’t intend to assert the first sentence of your syllogism. Instead, I would say, “If a hypothesis is not falsifiable, then it is not scientific.” Adding the second statement yields: “If a hypothesis is know to be false, then it might be scientific.” That’s a true statement, but I don’t claim it is very insightful.
Yes. Falsifiability is a poor definition of science and is self-undermining in the sense that it can’t pass its own test.
Of course not. I’m not claiming a scientific theory must be true. I’m claiming that known falseness (which implies falsifiability) is not a sufficient condition for being scientific.
That statement does not itself constrain experience. That’s not a useful critique of the statement.
Know falseness is not really same thing as falsifiability. Known falseness is useless in deciding whether a theory is scientific. Both the Greek pantheon and geocentric theories are known to be false.
Falsifiability is simply the requirement that a scientific theory to list things that can’t happen under that theory. Falsifiability says scientific theory don’t look for evidence in support, they look for evidence to test the theory.
The fact that no false statements appear doesn’t mean that the scientific theory isn’t falsifiable. The fact that every statement of a theory has been true does not mean that the theory is falsifiable.
That doesn’t seem true. The statement seems to perfectly constrain experience: you will not experience situations where theories which do not constrain experience will still be falsified.
And indeed, watching the world go by over the years, I see theories like ‘Christianity’ or ‘psychoanalysis’ which do not constrain experience at all have yet to be falsified—exactly as predicted.
Fine, you want to be contrary. What experience would falsify the partial definition of scientific theory that I have labelled “the principle of falsifiability”? If no such experience exists, does this call into doubt the usefulness of the principle?
Are you even trying here? Here’s what would falsify falsifiability: observing superior predictions being made by unfalsifiable theories, theories which have no reason to work but which do. Imagine a Christianity which came with texts loaded with prophetic symbolism which could be interpreted any way and is unfalsifiable, but which nevertheless keep turning out literally true (writes my hypothetical self, as he is tormented by Satanic wasps with the faces of humans prior to the sea turning into blood or something like that). In such a universe, falsifiability would be pretty useless.
Isn’t that essentially the best case for things like Nostradamus? Even assuming that the prophecies are accurate, they aren’t useful because they are so vague. The moment that the predictions are specific enough to be useful, they could be falsified.
What use is it to call that science? How could it possibly produce superior predictions in a world in which science works at all?
Yes, that is rather the question you should be answering if you want to criticize the desirability of falsifiability as being unfalsifiable itself...
I don’t understand where we disagree, so let me clarify my position: A prophecy that is so vague that it can’t be disproved is so vague that it doesn’t tell you what will happen ahead of time. Calling that a prediction abuses the term to the point of incoherency.
Yes, that’s almost entirely a definitional point. Definitions aren’t necessarily empirical statements. They are either useful or not useful in thinking carefully. Thus, the fact that they cannot be falsified is not a relevant thing to say, in the same way that it isn’t useful to object that the Pythagorean theory can’t be falsified.
If you intend to invoke some other critique of Popper and his use of falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science, please by more explicit, because I don’t understand your argument.
Nothing in this reply contradicts anything I have asserted. I was merely claiming that if falsifiability is a sufficient condition for a hypothesis to be “scientific”, then all theories known to be false are scientific (because if we know they are false, then they must be falsifiable). I’m not being contrarian; I’m pointing out a deductive consequence of the very definition of falsifiability that you linked to. Hopefully this closes the inferential distance:
If a hypothesis is falsifiable, then it is scientific.
If a hypothesis is known to be false, then it is falsifiable.
Therefore, if a hypothesis is known to be false then it is scientific.
I am merely denying the first premise via reductio ad absurdum, because the conclusion is obviously false (and the second premise isn’t). If you took my claim to be something other than this, then you have simply misread me.
That’s much clearer. I didn’t intend to assert that falsifiability was a sufficient condition for a theory being scientific, only that it is a necessary condition. That’s what I mean by saying it was a partial definition.
Thus, I don’t intend to assert the first sentence of your syllogism. Instead, I would say, “If a hypothesis is not falsifiable, then it is not scientific.” Adding the second statement yields: “If a hypothesis is know to be false, then it might be scientific.” That’s a true statement, but I don’t claim it is very insightful.