# ialdabaoth comments on Pascal’s Mugging: Tiny Probabilities of Vast Utilities

• Noth­ing could pos­si­bly be that weak.

In other ar­ti­cles, you have dis­cussed the no­tion that, in an in­finite uni­verse, there ex­ist with prob­a­bil­ity 1 iden­ti­cal copies of me some 10^(10^29) {span} away. You then (cor­rectly, I think) demon­strate the ab­sur­dity of declar­ing that one of them in par­tic­u­lar is ‘re­ally you’ and an­other is a ‘mere copy’.

When you say “3^^^^3 peo­ple”, you are pre­sent­ing me two sep­a­rate con­cepts:

1. In­di­vi­d­ual en­tities which are each “peo­ple”.

2. A set {S} of these en­tities, of which there are 3^^^^3 mem­bers.

Now, at this point, I have to ask my­self: “what is the prob­a­bil­ity that {S} ex­ists?”

By which I mean, what is the prob­a­bil­ity that there are 3^^^^3 unique con­figu­ra­tions, each of which qual­ifies as a self-aware, ex­pe­rienc­ing en­tity with moral weight, with­out re­duc­ing to an “effec­tive simu­la­tion” of an­other en­tity already counted in {S}?

Vs. what is the prob­a­bil­ity that the to­tal car­di­nal­ity of unique con­figu­ra­tions that each qual­ify as self-aware, ex­pe­rienc­ing en­tities with moral weight, is < 3^^^^3?

Be­cause if we’re go­ing to jug­gle Bayesian prob­a­bil­ities here, at some point that has to get stuck in the pipe and smoked, too.