You made the general point earlier, which I very much agree with, about opportunity cost. Simulating humanity’s current time-line has an opportunity cost in the form of some paradise that could exist in it’s place. You seem to think that the paradise is clearly better, and I agree: from our current moral perspective.
It seems you’re arguing that our successors will develop a preference for simulating universes like ours over paradises. If that’s what you’re arguing, then what reason do we have to believe that this is probable?
If their preferences do not change significantly from ours, it seems highly unlikely that they will create simulations identical to our current existence. And out of the vast space of possible ways their preferences could change, selecting that direction in the absence of evidence is a serious case of privileging the hypothesis.
It seems you’re arguing that our successors will develop a preference for simulating universes like ours over paradises. If that’s what you’re arguing, then what reason do we have to believe that this is probable?
If their preferences do not change significantly from ours, it seems highly unlikely that they will create simulations identical to our current existence. And out of the vast space of possible ways their preferences could change, selecting that direction in the absence of evidence is a serious case of privileging the hypothesis.