And there’s an at least apparent contradiction in the idea of a self-mover which is moved by something else in the very sense that it moves itself.
When I think of moving something to move itself I think of building an engine and turning it on such that it moves itself. There seems to be no contradiction here. I interpreted “what is free is cause of itself” as meaning that self-movement is necessary but not necessarily sufficient for free will. If an engine can be moved and yet move itself, just as an engine can be moved and yet be fluffy, then that means our will can be moved and yet move itself, contra the objection. Which part of this argument is incorrect or besides the point? (I apologize if I’m missing something obvious, I’m a little scatterbrained at the moment.)
Well, the objection to which Tom is replying goes like this: if a free cause is a cause of itself, and if our actions are caused by something other then ourselves, and given that God is a cause of our actions ((Proverbs 21:1): “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it” and (Philippians 2:13): “It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.”) then we do not have free will.
In other words, the relation being described in the objection isn’t like the maker, the machine, and the machine’s actions. The objection is talking about a case where a given action has two causes: we are the direct cause, and God is the indirect cause by being a direct cause on us. God is a direct cause on us not (just) in the manner of a creator, but as a cause specifically of this action.
So I grant you that there is no incompatibility to be found in the idea that self-movers are created beings. I’m saying that the objection points rather to an incompatibility between a specific action’s being both freely cause by me, and indirectly caused by God. In the case of the machine that you present, you are correctly called a cause of the machine and the machine’s being a self-mover, but I think you wouldn’t say that you’re therefore an indirect cause of any of the machine’s specific actions. If you were, especially knowingly so, this would call into question the machine’s status as a self mover.
I still can’t parse the maze of “direct” and “indirect” causes you’re describing, but note that an event can often be parsed as having multiple different explanations (in particular, “causes”) at the same time, none of which “more direct”, “more real” than the other. See for example the post Evolutionary Psychology and its dependencies.
but note that an event can often be parsed as having multiple different explanations (in particular, “causes”) at the same time, none of which “more direct”, “more real” than the other.
Fair enough, but they can often be parsed in terms of more and less directness. For example, say a mob boss orders that Donny kill Jimmy. Donny is the cause of Jimmy’s death directly: he’s the one that shot him. But if the boss is the indirect cause by ordering Donny: an alternative is that the boss kills Jimmy himself, and then the boss is the cause of Jimmy’s death directly.
The reason we don’t need to get too metaphysical to answer the question ‘Is Aquinas’ reply to objector #3 satisfying?′ is that the nature of the causes at issue isn’t really relevant. The objector is pointing out that God is a cause of my throwing the stone in the same way (it doesn’t much matter what ‘way’ this is) that I am the cause of my arm’s movement. If we refuse to call my arm a free agent, we should refuse to call me a free agent.
Now, of course, we could develop a theory of causality which solves this problem. But I don’t think Aquinas does that in a satisfactory way.
(Additional bizarre value to this conversation is gained by me not caring in the least what Aquinas thought or said...)
The reason we don’t need to get too metaphysical to answer the question ‘Is Aquinas’ reply to objector #3 satisfying?′ is that the nature of the causes at issue isn’t really relevant. The objector is pointing out that God is a cause of my throwing the stone in the same way (it doesn’t much matter what ‘way’ this is) that I am the cause of my arm’s movement. If we refuse to call my arm a free agent, we should refuse to call me a free agent.
What does “the same” mean? What is a “way” for different “ways” to be “same” or not? This remains unclear to me. How does it matter what we agree or refuse to call something?
Perhaps (as a wild guess on my part) you’re thinking in terms of more syntactic pattern-matching: if two things are “same”, they can be interchanged in statements that include their mention? This is rather brittle and unenlightening, this post gives one example of how that breaks down.
Additional bizarre value to this conversation is gained by me not caring in the least what Aquinas thought or said...
I think attempts to clarify my argument will be fruitless in abstraction from its context: if you take me to be positing a theory of causality, or to be making general claims about the problem of free will, then almost everything I say will sound empty. All I’m saying is that objector #3 has a good point, and Aquinas doesn’t answer him in a satisfying way.
This isn’t a special feature of my argumentation: in general it will be hard to make sense of what people are arguing about if we ignore both the premises to which they initially agreed (i.e. the terms of the objector’s objection, and of Aquinas’s response) and the conclusion they are fighting over (whether or not the response is satisfying). No amount of clarifying, swapping out terms, etc. will be helpful. Rather, you and I should just start over (if you like) with our own question.
When I think of moving something to move itself I think of building an engine and turning it on such that it moves itself. There seems to be no contradiction here. I interpreted “what is free is cause of itself” as meaning that self-movement is necessary but not necessarily sufficient for free will. If an engine can be moved and yet move itself, just as an engine can be moved and yet be fluffy, then that means our will can be moved and yet move itself, contra the objection. Which part of this argument is incorrect or besides the point? (I apologize if I’m missing something obvious, I’m a little scatterbrained at the moment.)
Well, the objection to which Tom is replying goes like this: if a free cause is a cause of itself, and if our actions are caused by something other then ourselves, and given that God is a cause of our actions ((Proverbs 21:1): “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it” and (Philippians 2:13): “It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.”) then we do not have free will.
In other words, the relation being described in the objection isn’t like the maker, the machine, and the machine’s actions. The objection is talking about a case where a given action has two causes: we are the direct cause, and God is the indirect cause by being a direct cause on us. God is a direct cause on us not (just) in the manner of a creator, but as a cause specifically of this action.
So I grant you that there is no incompatibility to be found in the idea that self-movers are created beings. I’m saying that the objection points rather to an incompatibility between a specific action’s being both freely cause by me, and indirectly caused by God. In the case of the machine that you present, you are correctly called a cause of the machine and the machine’s being a self-mover, but I think you wouldn’t say that you’re therefore an indirect cause of any of the machine’s specific actions. If you were, especially knowingly so, this would call into question the machine’s status as a self mover.
I still can’t parse the maze of “direct” and “indirect” causes you’re describing, but note that an event can often be parsed as having multiple different explanations (in particular, “causes”) at the same time, none of which “more direct”, “more real” than the other. See for example the post Evolutionary Psychology and its dependencies.
Fair enough, but they can often be parsed in terms of more and less directness. For example, say a mob boss orders that Donny kill Jimmy. Donny is the cause of Jimmy’s death directly: he’s the one that shot him. But if the boss is the indirect cause by ordering Donny: an alternative is that the boss kills Jimmy himself, and then the boss is the cause of Jimmy’s death directly.
The reason we don’t need to get too metaphysical to answer the question ‘Is Aquinas’ reply to objector #3 satisfying?′ is that the nature of the causes at issue isn’t really relevant. The objector is pointing out that God is a cause of my throwing the stone in the same way (it doesn’t much matter what ‘way’ this is) that I am the cause of my arm’s movement. If we refuse to call my arm a free agent, we should refuse to call me a free agent.
Now, of course, we could develop a theory of causality which solves this problem. But I don’t think Aquinas does that in a satisfactory way.
(Additional bizarre value to this conversation is gained by me not caring in the least what Aquinas thought or said...)
What does “the same” mean? What is a “way” for different “ways” to be “same” or not? This remains unclear to me. How does it matter what we agree or refuse to call something?
Perhaps (as a wild guess on my part) you’re thinking in terms of more syntactic pattern-matching: if two things are “same”, they can be interchanged in statements that include their mention? This is rather brittle and unenlightening, this post gives one example of how that breaks down.
I think attempts to clarify my argument will be fruitless in abstraction from its context: if you take me to be positing a theory of causality, or to be making general claims about the problem of free will, then almost everything I say will sound empty. All I’m saying is that objector #3 has a good point, and Aquinas doesn’t answer him in a satisfying way.
This isn’t a special feature of my argumentation: in general it will be hard to make sense of what people are arguing about if we ignore both the premises to which they initially agreed (i.e. the terms of the objector’s objection, and of Aquinas’s response) and the conclusion they are fighting over (whether or not the response is satisfying). No amount of clarifying, swapping out terms, etc. will be helpful. Rather, you and I should just start over (if you like) with our own question.