I find the SA has much stronger support—Tegmark requires the additional belief that other physical universes exist for which we can never possibly find evidence for against.
How could we find evidence of the universe simulating our own, if we are in a simulation? They’re both logical arguments, not empirical ones.
Regardless, worship is not a defining characteristic of theism.
The SA gives us a reasonable structure within which to (re)-evaluate theism.
I really don’t see what is so desirable about theism that we ought to define it to line up near-perfectly with the simulation argument in order to use it and related terminology. Any rhetorical scaffolding for dealing with Creators that theists have built up over the centuries is dripping with the negative connotations I referenced earlier. What net advantage do we gain by using it?
How could we find evidence of the universe simulating our own, if we are in a simulation? They’re both logical arguments, not empirical ones.
If say in 2080 we have created a number of high-fidelity historical recreations of 2010 with billions of sentient virtual humans who which is nearly indistinguishable (from their perspective) to our original 2010, then much of the uncertainty in the argument is eliminated.
(some uncertainty always remains, of course)
The other distinct possibility is that our simulation reaches some endpoint and possible re-integration, at which point it would be obvious.
How could we find evidence of the universe simulating our own, if we are in a simulation? They’re both logical arguments, not empirical ones.
I really don’t see what is so desirable about theism that we ought to define it to line up near-perfectly with the simulation argument in order to use it and related terminology. Any rhetorical scaffolding for dealing with Creators that theists have built up over the centuries is dripping with the negative connotations I referenced earlier. What net advantage do we gain by using it?
If say in 2080 we have created a number of high-fidelity historical recreations of 2010 with billions of sentient virtual humans who which is nearly indistinguishable (from their perspective) to our original 2010, then much of the uncertainty in the argument is eliminated.
(some uncertainty always remains, of course)
The other distinct possibility is that our simulation reaches some endpoint and possible re-integration, at which point it would be obvious.