Jeez, this is not about statistics. It’s about philosophy. With assumptions about distribution, randomness and other stuffs aside, you still have type I and type II errors. The fact that you see 1,000 out of 1,000 elephants are grey doesn’t mean that all elephants are grey, or elephants are naturally grey.
You are assuming too much, maybe? I also recommend that you read Karl Popper and related articles about falsificationism, verficationism and philosophy of science in general.
Jeez, this is not about statistics. It’s about philosophy. With assumptions about distribution, randomness and other stuffs aside, you still have type I and type II errors. The fact that you see 1,000 out of 1,000 elephants are grey doesn’t mean that all elephants are grey, or elephants are naturally grey.
No. Statistics and epistemology are deeply related. That’s why Manfred is recommending Jaynes. Or if you prefer, read some of the essays here on Bayesianism.
You are assuming too much, maybe? I also recommend that you read Karl Popper and related articles about falsificationism, verficationism and philosophy of science in general.
Philosophy of science has progressed quite a bit since Popper (Jaynes, Ramsey, Quine, Lakatos, and Kuhn would all be relevant individual authors if we’re playing the throw out names game.) I’m not as sympathetic to the strong Bayesian position as many people on LW, but it is a position that is a) most commonly accepted here and b) does a strikingly good job of resolving many of the major phil sci problems (for example it makes the raven paradox almost trivial instead of being a deep issue.) If you are going to take a position other than Bayesianism here, you are going to need to understand Bayesianism and articulate in detail what you think is wrong with it and why your viewpoint is better. And neo-Popperism isn’t going to satisfy people.
Jeez, this is not about statistics. It’s about philosophy. With assumptions about distribution, randomness and other stuffs aside, you still have type I and type II errors. The fact that you see 1,000 out of 1,000 elephants are grey doesn’t mean that all elephants are grey, or elephants are naturally grey.
You are assuming too much, maybe? I also recommend that you read Karl Popper and related articles about falsificationism, verficationism and philosophy of science in general.
No. Statistics and epistemology are deeply related. That’s why Manfred is recommending Jaynes. Or if you prefer, read some of the essays here on Bayesianism.
Philosophy of science has progressed quite a bit since Popper (Jaynes, Ramsey, Quine, Lakatos, and Kuhn would all be relevant individual authors if we’re playing the throw out names game.) I’m not as sympathetic to the strong Bayesian position as many people on LW, but it is a position that is a) most commonly accepted here and b) does a strikingly good job of resolving many of the major phil sci problems (for example it makes the raven paradox almost trivial instead of being a deep issue.) If you are going to take a position other than Bayesianism here, you are going to need to understand Bayesianism and articulate in detail what you think is wrong with it and why your viewpoint is better. And neo-Popperism isn’t going to satisfy people.