Why would anyone want to pay a fortune for a system that is expected to let ~40 warheads through (assuming ~99% overall interception rate which will require average rate of 99.99+%), about the same as the number of ICBMs the Soviet Union had in service during the Cuban Missile Crisis? Unacceptable damage is the cornerstone of the nuclear deterrence, MAD or not (there is no MAD between India and Pakistan, for example).
The RV separation distance is normally around ~100 km (even up to 300 km in some cases) not 10 km, and the decoy dispersal might be expected on the same order of magnitude. It will be easy to ramp it up BTW with a cheap modernization.
None of the US adversaries really practice counterforce targeting, so the silo protection is moot.
Why would anyone want to pay a fortune for a system that is expected to let ~40 warheads through (assuming ~99% overall interception rate which will require average rate of 99.99+%), about the same as the number of ICBMs the Soviet Union had in service during the Cuban Missile Crisis? Unacceptable damage is the cornerstone of the nuclear deterrence, MAD or not (there is no MAD between India and Pakistan, for example).
The RV separation distance is normally around ~100 km (even up to 300 km in some cases) not 10 km, and the decoy dispersal might be expected on the same order of magnitude. It will be easy to ramp it up BTW with a cheap modernization.
None of the US adversaries really practice counterforce targeting, so the silo protection is moot.