[...] we have to first recognize that the treatment of the marshrutka drivers was part of a more systematic policy (if it could be called that), one that was dictated not by economics but by a political logic. It was: Remain in power by creating economic disorder.
Shevardnadze behaved in this way in large part because he was in a much weaker position than the other state builders we have encountered in this and the previous chapter. Even after he outsmarted the warlords he was faced with strong regional powers within Georgia. He was grasping on to power rather than building a capable state, and he tried to do this by placating powerful interests by co-opting them with riches (or at the very least with bribes). Corruption in developing countries is common, so marshrutka drivers’ bribing state officials isn’t that unusual. But what went on in Georgia was a little different from this type of corruption. Shevardnadze set up the system so that the drivers were bound to break the law, and this provided low-hanging fruit for the police. He made lawbreaking inevitable and created a system that encouraged corruption.
The main reason for this was to control society, which was now continually guilty of breaking the law. You could avoid implementation of the law by paying a bribe today, but the state could come after you at any time. Yet this scheme also controlled officials in the state, another potentially powerful group—accepting bribes was illegal, so the state could go after them too if it wanted to.
Looking at the source of the first quote in the post, this, shortly after, is interesting: